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ABSTRACT 
 
HOW LARGE CHANGES IN THE FUNCTIONING ECONOMY EFFECT CRIME 
RATES IN AMERICA:  A NATIONAL EXAMINATION OF THE LESS CASH – LESS 
CRIME PARADIGM  
 
By 
 
DONALD E HUNT 
 
December, 2017 
 
Committee Chair:  Dr. Volkan Topalli 
 
Major Department: Criminology and Criminal Justice 
 
The amount of cash in circulation appears to be decreasing the world over.  With 
advances in payments technology, society is trending toward cashlessness. While the benefits are 
numerous, one particular advantage is its reducing effect on crime. Scholars on a global level 
continue to show that cash and crime are linked. Decreasing cash decreases crime and the 
reverse. However, this concept went untested in the US until recently. Taking advantage of 
legislation mandating that states replace welfare benefits checks with reloadable debit cards, 
Wright et al. explored the idea that this change reduced the amount of circulating cash and, 
subsequently, decreased predatory crimes. In this study, I build on that research by testing the 
same phenomenon but at a national level. I then add to these results by testing the cash and crime 
relationship on the states receiving the most benefits, the most urban states, and those with the 
highest rates of predatory crime controlling for relevant economic and social factors shown to 
influence crime. Findings for each of these analyses provide modest support for the hypothesis 
that reducing cash reduces street crime. I further test the notion that of drugs could be acting as 
the mechanism driving the need to commit crime for cash, but the data contained too much 
missingness and did not allow for a robust analysis. However, the general pattern of significant 
 
 
results imply that cash and street crime share a significant relationship. The results may also 
explain part of the American crime drop; not only by the decrease itself but perhaps also in the 
form of a crime shift. Policy implications advocate for continued advances in electronic 
payments, cooperation between government and private entities, and future explorations into 
new opportunities for crime in a digital age.  
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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
 This research explores the relationship between cash and street crime. Research indicates 
that cash can be a chief source of fuel for traditional street crime and its constituent offenses 
(robbery, burglary, theft, and auto theft) (Naylor, 2003, Youngs, Ioannou, & Eagles, 2014). What 
then would happen to the levels of these crimes with a reduction in the amount of circulating 
cash?  
In the past, a key contributor to the amount of circulating cash in America has been 
welfare payments (Rhine & Greene, 2013). Before the mid-1990s, the government distributed 
assistance benefits at monthly intervals by paper check. While this antiquated system was costly, 
inefficient, and fraud-ridden, it also may have predisposed some of its recipients to crime 
victimization. Because recipients were typically unbanked, they were often required to cash their 
checks and carry it with them to pay bills and buy necessary items (Ford & Beverage, 2004; 
Katz, 1996; Rhine & Greene, 2013). This circumstance subsequently created a pool of potential 
victims for cash-oriented, or predatory, offenders.  
Then, in the mid-1990s, Congress mandated the delivery of government benefits 
payments through an Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) system that replaced paper checks with 
reloadable debit cards (Pulliam, 1997). That shift saved millions in paper and ink costs, delivered 
funds more effectively, and simultaneously reduced welfare fraud (Pulliam, 1997). Moreover, 
this change lessened the need for beneficiaries to carry cash (Humphrey, Kim, & Vale, 2001) 
thereby reducing both the amount of cash in circulation and the size of the pool of potential 
victims of cash-driven crimes. Subsequently, it stands to reason that the switch to reloadable 
EBT cards might also have had a negative effect on the occurrence of crimes to obtain cash.  
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 With declining amounts of circulating cash brought about by EBT implementation, it is 
also plausible to assume this would also bring about a reduction in drug sales and possession 
resulting in fewer drug arrests. One possible motivation behind the need to commit crime to 
obtain cash is drugs. Since engaging in illicit drug activity requires cash (Inciardi, 1986, 2007; 
U.N., 2010; Walters, 2013), drugs could theoretically be acting as a mediator between cash and 
crime. Having less cash in circulation may negatively impact the drug market, which could have 
a negative effect on cash-driven street crimes.  
 To test these ideas, I first performed an analysis of the direct effect of reducing 
circulating cash through the EBT system on predatory crime (offenses driven by monetary gain). 
I based this part of the study on a previous study conducted in the state of Missouri where 
authors found that reducing the amount of circulating cash through EBT implementation brought 
about a 9.8% reduction in overall crime (see Tekin, Topalli, McClellan, Wright, 2014 and 
Wright, Tekin, Topalli, McClellan, Dickinson, & Rosenfeld, 2017). If the amount of circulating 
cash influences certain crimes, then a regression analysis using national data should produce 
similar results. This not only tests Wright et al.’s results and whether their findings were endemic 
to Missouri or protractible to the rest of the country, but also provides insight into the veracity of 
the cash and crime relationship in general. However, where the Missouri study stopped, I went 
on to more rigorously interrogate this relationship. It may not be enough to say that crime 
declines with a reduction in circulating cash. It is important to note that the predicted effects 
carry with them certain assumptions. First, street crime commonly concentrates in urban areas 
where populations are dense enough to support a thriving cash dependent market.  Second, such 
crimes require infusion of cash that would logically tie to the distribution and expenditure of 
welfare benefits (most often manifested as cash).  To address this, I include additional analyses 
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that focus on these characteristics. I performed additional analyses on the states receiving the 
most benefits in comparison to the states receiving the least, the states with the highest urban 
density in comparison to the most rural, and the states with the highest street crime rates in 
comparison to the lowest. Further, because some research suggests that street crime is a more 
urban phenomenon where welfare benefits are higher, adding these further analyses offers 
researchers a deeper understanding of the nature of cash as it influences offending behavior.       
I then turn the focus of the study toward the determination of the effect of drugs as a 
potential mediator between cash and crime. It is possible that drug market patterns and cash flow 
patterns differ for endemic reasons from those that we would see at a national level. If people are 
motivated to acquire cash because they need an anonymous transnational medium to obtain 
illegal drugs, then we would expect to see that manifest itself in such a mediational analysis. 
Drug markets generally require cash. If cash is reduced then it could be that the drug markets are 
similarly affected and as a result, the crime to acquire the cash should also exhibit analogous 
effects. To make this determination, I utilized Sobol’s test of significance by means of 
performing a path analysis.   
  Criminologists benefit from this research in two ways. Primarily, significant findings 
indicating that reducing cash reduces street crime would quantitatively strengthen research that 
has been, to this point, most often qualitative. On a larger scale, significant results might imply 
that some portion of the American crime decline could be due to a reduction in circulating cash 
brought about by advances in electronic payments technologies such as the EBT system. Since 
both the program’s enactment and the crime rate reversal occurred in the mid-1990s, one could 
make the argument that the two share an important and, up to now, undiscovered correlation. 
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Moreover, if reducing cash also affects the drug market, drug policies would benefit from 
incorporating an element of digitizing payments.  
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CHAPTER II 
Literature Review 
The Decline of Cash 
 With ever-advancing innovations in payments technologies, the global payments 
infrastructure continues to transform from cash-heavy to technology-driven (Kurzweil, 2004; 
Jorgenson, 2001). In particular, the financial industry has been moving ever closer to a 
completely digital transaction system (Erling, 2013). By all accounts, this trend will continue 
greatly reducing, or eliminating, the need for cash. As with any advancement, the emergence of a 
digital economy comes with benefits and challenges.  
 The advantages of an electronic financial system are numerous. Consumers enjoy the 
convenience of virtual transactions, the ease of tracking expenditures, and the overall speed of 
digital payments and purchases (Salamah, 2017). Governments, such as Africa institution the 
mobile payments application M-PESA system and Mexico implementing the conditional cash 
transfer (CCT) program, also benefit from the shift away from paper money. Through the 
emergence of the electronic infrastructure, the government delivers and receives funding more 
safely and efficiently, trimming operating costs in the process (Jarupunphol & Buathong, 2013; 
Ross-Roach, 2016). Additionally, the corporations developing the technologies facilitating the 
move toward a predominantly digital society benefit through increased profits, while businesses, 
in general, see increased returns through public spending on a global platform (Rogoff, 2015). 
 There are also disadvantages to a move toward a cashless society. The same technology 
that makes a virtual financial infrastructure advantageous also creates certain complications. 
Chiefly among these, the system itself is completely dependent on technology. That is, should 
the system fail (e.g. power failure, hacking, terrorist activity), the negative effects could be felt 
on a global basis, to include an economic crisis (Morley & Robins, 2002). Moreover, a cyber-
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economy invites new opportunities for cyber-criminals. Money launderings, fraud, and illicit 
drug sales are among the more common methods of illegal exploitation of the virtual system 
(Alhogbani, 2014).   
 Despite these issues, the number of countries endorsing a cashless infrastructure increases 
each year. Sweden is considered one of the world leaders in the move toward a completely 
cashless country (Arvidsson, Hedman, & Segendorf, 2016). Cash transactions in that country 
currently make up only 3% of its total transactions, and the amount of krona (the national 
currency) in circulation has dropped from over 100 billion in 2009 to just over 80 billion in 2015 
(Biswas, 2016; Henley, 2016). Best estimates project Sweden to be completely cashless by 2020 
(Arvidsson, 2013). In Denmark, over 30% of the population transacts solely through mobile 
devices, and the Danish government has set a deadline for eliminating paper money by 2030 
(Biswas, 2016). Similarly, banks in Norway no longer dispense cash (Mukhopadhyay, 2016).  
 The same pattern exists across Africa. Liquid cash in Somaliland is rapidly decreasing, 
and even street vendors accept mobile payments (Biswas, 2017). Cards are the primary mode of 
payment in this country where the average consumer makes 34 online transactions per month, 
the highest in the world (Biswas, 2017; Stremlau & Osman, 2015). Kenya also adopted and 
endorses the cell-phone based money transfer app M-PESA1 for its citizens. The M-PESA design 
allows millions of Somalis with no access to a bank account but who possess a mobile phone to 
send and receive money and pay bills. Current estimates suggest that 15 million users subscribe 
to M-PESA (Vodaphone, 2017) and many Kenyans receive their salaries via this system (Biswas, 
2017; Mbiti & Weil, 2013).  
                                                 
1 Pesa is the Swahili word for money.   
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 Canada and the United States are likewise moving toward a cashless economy. Over 90% 
of Canadians opt for cashless transactions where the majority of payments occur through debit 
and credit cards (70%) and more than half of the public prefer online wallets to carrying cash 
(Biswas, 2017; Thomas, Jain, & Angus, 2013). In the United States, the leader in cashless 
technology innovation (Liu, Kauffman, & Ma, 2015), authorities estimate that consumers 
currently use cash for less than half of all transactions, and less than 40% of Americans carry 
cash on daily basis (Epstein, 2017; FRBSF, 2016; Rolfe, 2017). Further, greater than 75% of the 
population owns a cell phone and over half of them use it to make payments (Meola, 2016).  
 Current research indicates that new payments technologies emerge regularly, continuing 
the drive toward a cashless society (Taylor, 2016). Based on the increasing number of countries 
embracing payments technologies, the advantages seem to outweigh the drawbacks of a digital 
economy. One, yet unmentioned advantage of such a move, is that it appears to affect criminal 
behavior.  
What We Know about the Link between Cash and Crime 
 Research suggests that payments systems at large could be in some part responsible for 
worldwide reductions in crime and violence. Consider the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) 
Program; a system utilized in many third world countries. The CCT program offers monetary 
incentives to parents below the poverty line for their children’s schooling and health checks 
(Fernald, Gertler, & Neufeld, 2008). Two countries, Uruguay and Brazil, instituted (revamped) 
the CCT program in 2008 with differing, and unintended, crime consequences (Borraz & Munyo, 
2015; Chioda, De Mello, & Soares; 2016). One possible reason for these opposing responses 
may stem from the way these respective governments implemented the program. In Uruguay, the 
initial CCT enterprise failed to incentivize its citizens to participate. To increase involvement, 
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the government not only doubled the amount of the incentive but also paid it in cash (Borraz & 
Munyo, 2015). The number of recipients increased by 15%. After the change, crime and violence 
in Uruguay increased (Borraz & Munyo, 2015). During the same year, however, the country of 
Brazil paid its CCT participants through an electronic bank deposit as opposed to cash payouts. 
After their program’s implementation, crime significantly decreased (Borraz & Munyo, 2015). 
Because one main difference in the two programs was the type of incentive – cash payments 
versus electronic payments – an apparent link between cash and crime begins to appear. This 
correlation occurred in other countries as well.  
In 2002, the Argentinian banking system nearly collapsed. Following a series of 
unfavorable events, thousands lost faith in the system and withdrew their funds from banks in 
cash (Boschi, 2005). During this time, the government offered its CCT incentives in cash as well. 
Meloni (2014) took this information and combined it with the known crime rates for burglary, 
larceny, aggravated assault, homicide, and overall crime. He then regressed these outcomes on 
the cash incentives and included relevant control variables both over time and lagged. The results 
indicated that the country’s crime rates, especially for robbery and larceny, increased building on 
the premise that increasing the amount of circulating cash can contribute to a rising crime rate 
(Meloni, 2014). The Philippines and Mexico experienced similar drops post-CCT 
implementation (Brito, Corbacho, & Osorio, 2014; Crost, Felter, & Johnston, 2016). In the 
Philippines, Crost, Felter, and Johnston (2016) conducted a difference in differences analysis on 
the effect of program implementation on crime and violence. Their findings suggest that CCT 
program implementation may have contributed to a 2% drop in violent attacks with an 
underlying criminal motivation (Crost, Felter, & Johnston, 2016). Similarly, Brito, Corbacho, 
and Osorio (2014)  conducted two-stage least sqaures regression analyses on the Mexican CCT 
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remittance program and found that every 1% increase correlated with a reduction in homicide by 
0.05% and street robbery by 0.19% (Brito, Corbacho, & Osorio, 2014). Removing circulating 
cash through the CCT program in Africa may have also contributed to a marked reduction in 
crime factoring also into the decline of civil unrest (Garcia, Moore, & Moore, 2012; Standing, 
2007). Using descriptive and multivariate regression analysis, both Garcia, Moore, and Moore 
(2012) and Standing, 2007) found that, among the various other benefits that implementing the 
CCT program brought with it, recipients felt safer, tended to migrate less, and were less targeted 
by the criminal element.   
 As time progresses, countries are recognizing that a cashless economy is an effective tool 
for reducing crime. For instance, DNB, the largest bank in Norway, proposed that the elimination 
of cash would reduce local black-market activity while at the same time serve to suppress money 
laundering on a global scale (Seth, 2017). In Sweden, the number of bank robberies dropped 
85% from 110 in 2008 to 16 in 2011 as the nation continued its full-on initiative to eliminate 
cash from their economy (Biswas, 2017; Rogoff, 2016). Specific to the US, certain crime rates in 
the state of Missouri decreased by 9.8% after the government switched from paper checks to the 
electronic transfer of welfare disbursements (Wright et al., 2017).  
But how does reducing the amount of cash in circulation bring about declines in crime 
rates? One explanation put forward has been the notion that cash fuels a certain lifestyle. 
Moreover, those engaging in that lifestyle tend to resort to crime to obtain the necessary cash to 
continue that type of living.  
Street Life, Offenders, and Cash 
 To understand how cash affects crime, it is important to identify some of the motivations 
of offenders. Research suggests that a subsection of society engages in what scholars refer to as 
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“street life” (Anderson, 1999, Hagan & McCarthy, 1991; Shover, 1996; Shover & Honaker, 
1992; Jacobs & Wright, 1999). People involved in this lifestyle tend to reject the moral and 
social traditions of mainstream society opting instead to engage in oppositional behaviors and 
living life as one continuous “party” (Shover & Honaker, 1992). While adherents primarily focus 
on the acquisition and use of illicit drugs and alcohol, street life also includes other deviant 
activities such as skipping school, street gambling, and sexual promiscuity (Shover & Honaker, 
1992). A common condition of engaging in many of these activities is that they often require 
cash. Further, because participants caught up in street life tend to spurn gainful employment, one 
practical way to obtain that cash is through predatory criminal behavior referred to as street 
crime (Jacobs, Topalli, & Wright, 2003; Lupton & Tulloch, 2002; Topalli & Wright, 2004, 2013; 
Tucker, Pollard, De La Haye, Kennedy, & Green, 2013).  
Cash and its Importance to Street Life 
 The street lifestyle may at first appear to be a life of crime for crime’s sake. Yet scholars 
point out that, in street culture, crime is a common and indispensable means of obtaining the cash 
necessary to purchase drugs, alcohol, and obtaining other black-market items underpinning this 
way of life (Naylor, 2004; Tucker et al., 2013; Topalli & Wright, 2004; Wright et al., 2017). 
Given the intensity with which adherents participate in street life, it is easy to understand why 
cash acts as the essential fuel that keeps the party going. It is important to note, however, that 
while cash is necessary for the purchase of goods in street markets, it has other advantages for 
street life participants. 
 Cash is one of the most liquid forms of transactions and, apart from modern crypto-
currencies, may be the only transactional medium capable of offering a high measure of 
anonymity allowing users to hide their activities from the authorities (Sander & Ta-Shma, 1999). 
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Pursuits such as gambling, prostitution, drug dealing, and other forms of illicit trade require cash 
for precisely this reason (Anderson, 1999, Shover & Honaker, 1992; Tekin, et al., 2014). Cash is 
also liquid. It requires no conversion for use and reuse in any market; legal or illegal. This 
characteristic is especially advantageous for making ill-gotten gains appear to be legitimate. 
Cash is also prevalent in street culture as a symbol of status. It represents respect among active 
street life participants and a substantial portion of the decisions made in this environment 
revolve, directly or indirectly, around it and its acquisition (Anderson, 1999; Brezina et al., 2009; 
Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Stewart & Simons, 2006; Zelizer, 1989). For example, Zelizer (1997) 
notes that in street culture there is a palpable difference between “clean” and “dirty” money 
beyond financial utility. Obtaining cash through predatory means elevates a person to a higher 
cultural status in this environment (Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Zelizer, 1997).  
Each of these characteristics makes cash well-matched for street life and the illicit gray 
and black-market transactions that it entails (Naylor, 2004; Schneider & Ernst, 2013). In street 
life, cash is valued as the primary medium to continue the party, a liquid and anonymous vehicle 
to obtain the goods common to the lifestyle, and a symbol of status and respect (Zelizer, 1997). 
However, its acquisition would hardly be possible without a pool of cash-carrying victims. 
Decreasing Cash in the US through EBT Implementation 
 Before the enactment of the EBT program, state governments disbursed welfare funds to 
their recipients via a monthly check. However, because these beneficiaries were receiving 
government assistance, they did not qualify for bank accounts (i.e., they were “unbanked” or 
“underbanked”; see FDIC, 2012; Ford & Beverage, 2004). This status generally forced 
beneficiaries to cash these checks to access their funds. Thus, they were left principally with only 
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cash to transact business, pay bills, or purchase necessities (Armey, Lipow, & Webb, 2012; Ford 
& Beverage, 2004; Rhine & Greene, 2014).  
 However, in the mid-1990s, Congress made a series of broadly sweeping policy changes. 
Recognizing that the current welfare structure was costly, inefficient, and open to fraud, 
legislators enacted the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act and the Omnibus Consolidated 
Rescissions and Appropriations Act. Proposed largely as a method to reduce government 
spending and streamline existing processes, Congress “strongly encouraged” each state to adopt 
a technology that disbursed assistance payments via the Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) 
system (Pulliam, 1997). Through this system, the government replaced monthly paper checks 
with reloadable payment cards (referred to as “EBT cards”).  
The advantages of this switch were numerous. Recipients now had a safer and more 
efficient manner of storing and accessing their funds. The EBT cards act as a pseudo bank 
account, which provided each cardholder with the beginnings of financial stability and 
creditworthiness. Moreover, the change made it extremely difficult to commit welfare check 
fraud (Cole, 2000). Finally, most relevant to this study, beneficiaries could now access only 
those funds that were necessary without having to resort to cashing their entire check and 
carrying that cash with them or storing it in their homes. Because the EBT system reduced the 
need to carry cash, it is logical to assume that it may have reduced some part of the amount of 
cash in circulation. Further, if EBT implementation reduced the amount of cash in circulation, it 
is also conceivable that the pool of cash-carrying potential victims also decreased, thereby 
providing fewer opportunities for street offenders to commit predatory crime. 
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Predatory Crimes 
 In as much as street life is different from traditional lifestyles, the crimes committed by 
street life participants also have unique qualities. Street offenders tend to engage in criminal 
behavior of a predatory nature born out of an environment that endorses such action. For 
example, Freeman (2000) demonstrated in a nationwide analysis of street crime that active 
engagement in street culture not only fosters the development of predatory crime but encourages 
its commission over legitimate means of attaining objectives, not the least of which are financial. 
Hallsworth (2013) published similar findings in his study of street life, writing that what 
differentiates street crime from others is that these offenses are cash-oriented, occur in an urban 
street environment, and tended to be violent. In addition, the results of several more studies show 
that more of these types of crimes exist in areas where welfare distribution and government 
assistance is higher (Linton, Jennings, Latkin, Kirk & Mehta, 2014; Martinez, 2014; Sampson, 
2013; Willits, Broidy, & Denman, 2013). Each of these factors is important to the current 
research. These types of crimes are cash-oriented, born of desperation, and predatory in nature. 
They also occur in areas where street life is prominent, and welfare benefits meaningfully 
contribute to the local economy (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Herbert, 1982; Krivo & Peterson, 
1996; Lochner, 2004; McBride-Murry, Berkel, Gaylord‐Harden, Copeland‐Linder, & Nation, 
2011). By reducing the amount of cash those welfare recipients need to carry, this might also 
decrease the occurrence of predatory offenses by reducing the pool of potential victims.  
 Recall that prior to the advent of the EBT system, beneficiaries tended to cash their paper 
checks due to their unbanked status.  This created a pool of potential cash carrying victims at a 
specific time and place), a fact known to would-be predatory offenders (Foley, 2011; Hastings & 
Washington, 2010; Ray et al., 2013; USDA, 2016; Vanroose & D’Espallier, 2013). As a case in 
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point, Foley (2011) studied 12 metropolitan cities over the course of the welfare payment cycle 
and observed a significant increase in crime around the same time beneficiaries received their 
welfare checks. The most sizeable increase in cash-oriented crimes occurred at the beginning of 
each month when the government distributed most of these payments suggesting that the 
offenders likely knew when and where to commit their offenses (Foley, 2011).  
 Additionally, predatory crimes stand out from others because unlying motivations such as 
desperation, determination, fear, and greed are at play with the added pressure of doing so to 
maintain the “party lifestyle” (Shover & Honaker, 1994; Topalli & Wright, 2013). These 
pressures may become manifest in the form of offenses with violent undertones, for example, 
carjacking, robbery, and assault (Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Rosenfeld & Messner, 2013). Jacobs 
and Wright’s interviews with active armed robbers in St. Louis, Missouri exemplifies this point. 
The authors observed that the endorsement of criminal behavior and mounting pressure to fund 
the street lifestyle drove the need to obtain quick cash (which was subsequently exhausted in 
short order). However, what is it about this lifestyle that causes such pressure to drive someone 
to commit such behavior?  One possible explanation is the desperate need for drugs.  
Drugs and Street life 
 One possible reason why street life participants engage in such predatory crime is to 
obtain the cash necessary to purchase the illicit drugs they desperately need. Allowing for this, 
one can reasonably assume that without drugs the relationship between cash and crime might be 
weaker than originally hypothesized. Illicit drugs, therefore, could be mediating the effect of that 
relationship. Scholars rooted in this field consistently find that illicit drug use is a staple of street 
culture and that cash is critical to maintaining access to it (Boardman et al., 2001; Collison, 
1996; Inciardi, 1979; McAra & McVie, 2005; Tucker et al., 2013; Vigil, 2010). For those 
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actively involved in street life, one way to obtain cash is through predatory crime (Freeman, 
2000; Hallsworth, 2013; Wright et al., 2017). Therefore, the cash-rich environments created by 
the welfare system before the implementation of the EBT program could support such 
criminality. Not surprisingly, these same locales also foster robust drug markets (MacDonald & 
Marsh, 2002). If one assumes that the reason behind the desperate need for cash is drugs and that 
the benefits distribution system before the change to electronic funding was a substantial source 
of the cash needed to purchase those drugs, then it is plausible to accept that EBT 
implementation reduced the pool of cash-carrying potential victims. That being the case, EBT 
implementation should also have a detrimental effect on the drugs market. In other words, if 
drugs mediate the relationship between cash and crime, then reducing cash should also reduce 
the drug market in some way.  
 To determine if drugs are truly acting as the mechanism for committing crime to obtain 
cash, I consider a model referenced by Wright et al. (2014) and found in Wright & Decker, 
(1997); the Etiological Cycle of Street Crime (Figure 1). This model represents a good 
demonstration of inductive theory development and is notable for using individual-level 
interview-based qualitative data on street offender decision-making to explain larger patterns of 
crime. Additionally, the base assumptions of the theory are in line with other structural 
explanations of crime; that there is a strong association between criminality and larger structural 
background factors. Scholars note that such antecedent conditions may include, for example, 
impoverished conditions, adherence to a street culture, unemployment, and a lack of formal 
education (Altindag, 2012; Anderson, 1999; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Hjalmarsson & 
Lochner, 2012; Lochner, 2004, 2011; McBride, Berkel, Gaylord‐Harden, Copeland‐Linder, & 
Nation, 2011; Mesters, van der Geest, & Bijleveld, 2016; Shover, 1996; Shover & Honaker, 
16 
 
1992; Topalli & Wright, 2013)  Wright and his colleagues (2017) further argue, however, that 
these factors do not cause crime per se; rather they place a certain subset of individuals at risk for 
participation in street life which sets the stage for predatory criminality later. A deeper look at 
the cycle provides more insight as to how cash drives crime in the street setting. 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Etiological Cycle of Street Crime 
 The cycle follows this basic pattern: After prolonged exposure and assimilation to street 
life, individuals enter the pursuit of illicit action and conspicuous consumption; often through 
partying and drug use. Eventually, the cash fueling these behaviors depletes resulting in a real 
sense of financial desperation. At this point, participants turn to predatory crime to replenish 
their cash stores. With cash replaced, the pursuit of illicit action and conspicuous behavior begins 
anew, and the cycle repeats. As offenders move through the cycle and their involvement in 
serious crime goes on unabated, their prospects for breaking the pattern and participating in 
conventional society (e.g., gainful employment, pursuing an education) diminish apace. The only 
constant that remains is the pursuit of illicit action and the seeking out of cash through street 
crime to keep the party going.  
 Two elements of the cycle lend themselves well to the current analysis. First, cash 
underpins nearly every stage of the cycle. Second, according to research, a good portion of the 
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illicit action in street life is rooted in the conspicuous consumption of illegally obtained drugs 
(Boardman et al., 2001; Collison, 1996; Inciardi, 1979; McAra & McVie, 2005; Tucker et al., 
2013; Vigil, 2010). It is plausible, then, to assume that drugs are driving the need for cash in the 
first place opening the door to the possibility that reducing the amount of available cash in 
circulation could diminish an offender’s ability to obtain the cash necessary to maintain the 
conspicuous consumption phase of the cycle.      
Testing these Relationships 
 One method to test the effect of reducing cash on street crime is to view EBT 
implementation as the treatment in a natural experiment and apply appropriate analytic 
techniques. Because different states introduced the program at varying times, and data exist both 
before and after EBT implementation, performing a panel data analysis will demonstrate the 
effect of reducing cash on predatory street crime. Moreover, the additional analysis of the cash 
and crime relationship in urban areas where benefits and street crime levels are high offers 
deeper insight into the true effects in a variety of environments. Testing drugs as a mediator 
between cash and crime also requires performing a path analysis in the style of Baron and 
Kenney’s (1986) original framework utilizing additional drug arrest data. The next section 
explains these processes in detail. 
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CHAPTER III 
Method 
Strategic Overview  
 To test the direct effects of reducing cash on street crime and additionally drugs as a 
mediator between them, I performed the analysis in two stages. In the first stage, I conducted a 
national examination based loosely on Wright et al.’s (2017) Missouri study utilizing the state-
by-state variation in EBT implementation to produce estimates of reducing cash on street 
crime(s). However, where the author’s focused their attention on the effect of reducing cash on 
crime in general, I went deeper and tested this effect under various conditions. I analyzed and 
compared this effect in both high and low benefits receiving states, urban and rural states, and 
states with the highest and lowest levels of street crime. Moreover, in the second phase of the 
overall analysis, I went even further and performed a path analysis in which I consider the notion 
that drugs may be acting as mechanism through which the need for cash influences crime. 
Data 
 The data for these analyses are a collection of publicly available, official government 
statistics consisting of street crimes, EBT implementation dates, and demographic information 
such as population, poverty level, unemployment rates, high school education, and imprisonment 
rates. These data originate from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR), the Bureau of Justice 
Statistics (BJS), the US Census Bureau, and the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) spanning five years before and after EBT implementation for each state individually 
and as a group. The first states began implementation in 1989, and every state was operating on 
the system by the end of 2004. The states that began implementing the program earlier took 
longer to completely onboard the program (likely due to the infrastructure at the time). However, 
as more states initiated the program, the total time it took to switch completely from paper 
19 
 
checks to electronic disbursement decreased. For instance, Maryland was the first to start the 
changeover. The process began in 1989 and did not finish until the middle part of 1993. Texas 
began implementing the system in mid-1994 and completed the process by the end of 1995. 
Later, states like Louisiana, Connecticut, and Alabama implemented the system completely in 
one year, 1997.  Thus, at a national level, the entire country began implementation in 1989 and 
completely changed over to the electronic system by 2004. But because the first state to 
implement the EBT system was Maryland, and a trend prior to this initiative is necessary to 
perform difference in differences analysis, I added in five years of previous data to Maryland’s 
data set. California was the last state to completely implement the EBT system in 2004. The 
analysis also requires data for five years post implementation completion.  Therefore, I added in 
those data to California’s dataset. I treated the remaining states in the same way. When adding in 
data 5 years before and after implementation for each state to establish the trends necessary for 
the analysis, the final dataset captured statistics from 1984 to 2009.  
Uniform Crime Report  
 The FBI is responsible for compiling the UCR and describes it as "a nationwide, 
cooperative statistical effort of nearly 18,000 cities, university and college, county, state, tribal, 
and other law enforcement agencies voluntarily reporting data on crimes brought to their 
attention.”2 The Bureau organizes each agency’s monthly records and makes them publicly 
available through their official website. The UCR is divided into Part I and Part II crimes. In 
general, the FBI differentiates Part I from Part II crimes by the seriousness of the offenses. Part I 
crimes include the offenses of homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. Part II crimes include simple assault, forgery and 
                                                 
2 http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr. 
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fraud, vandalism, prostitution, drug violations, and other less serious crimes. The current study 
utilizes the Part I crimes of robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft in addition to the Part II 
offense of drug violations.   
 Admittedly, the UCR contains some degree of error due to monthly reporting delays, or 
outright missingness from individual contributing agencies. However, researchers have shown 
these factors to be stable throughout each reporting state (Maltz & Targonski, 2002; Marcotte & 
Markowitz, 2011). Because the analyses performed in the current study include data from all or 
multiple states, this spread the missingness across the groups, which arguably evens out much of 
the bias by and large. Moreover, I aggregated monthly data to a year-end total to perform the 
analysis. According to Lynch and Addington (1996), while there may be a lag in the reporting of 
monthly data, the vast majority of agencies report their full annual data by the conclusion of each 
year. Because I am using year-end data in the analysis, the missingness in any of the months 
during the year are likely rendered immaterial by the end of the year and should not significantly 
bias the results.  
 Moreover, I am employing a fixed effects regression model for the subsequent analyses. 
This technique is particularly useful when there is a concern that omitted factors might correlate 
with key predictors at the group level; in this case, state-level data. Fundamentally, this type of 
regression takes into consideration the effect and correlation of the independent variable(s) 
within each unit of measure on the dependent variable over time. By doing so, this method takes 
into account the variation for each independent variable inside each state on multiple occasions 
considerably reducing the effect of omitted variable bias (see Cameron & Trivedi, 2010 and 
Gardiner, Luo, & Roman, 2009). This technique is explained in more detail later in this section.  
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 Even with these techniques in place, there still remains a central weakness with utilizing 
UCR data. That is, it only contains those crimes reported to the police rather than those that 
occurred. For instance, someone who has suffered a robbery as a result of drug rip-off might not 
report the robbery to the police for fear of revealing their involvement in illicit activity. The 
commission of the crime actually took place but the reporting of it did not (Skogan, 1977). 
Others might simply not report the crime because of the inconvenience. In either case, scholars 
refer to this issue as the “dark figure of crime” and can prove to be problematic when 
interpreting results based on this type of data (Biderman & Reiss, 1967; Coleman & Moynihan, 
1996; MacDonald, 2002). Unfortunately, there is no method that effectively accounts for this 
when using this data of data and interpretation of results stemming from this issue should be 
tempered with this knowledge. This includes the results to follow in the current study.   
Measures  
Dependent Variables 
Gathering the crime variables necessary to perform the analysis was relatively 
straightforward. The dependent variables collected for this part of the analysis include robbery, 
burglary, theft, and auto theft. Together, these crimes make up the aggregated street crime 
variable, which is the sum total of these crimes for each specific year in each individual state. To 
estimate drugs as a mediator between cash and crime, I utilized the Part II crime of drug 
violation. For each of the outcome variables, I utilized crime rates weighted per 100,000 
residents, rather than by individual count to bring each state onto the same metric. 
Street Crime  
 According to Hallsworth (2013), what differentiates street crime from others is that these 
offenses are predatory (cash-oriented) in nature and occur in the street environment. Moreover, 
22 
 
they tend to occur in urban-dense areas and may concentrate where poverty, unemployment, and 
welfare assistance abound (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Herbert, 1982; Krivo & Peterson, 1996; 
Lochner, 2004; McBride-Murry, Berkel, Gaylord‐Harden, Copeland‐Linder, & Nation, 2011). 
Scholarly research indicates that the crimes of robbery, burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft 
fall into this category (Baumer, Horney, Felson, & Lauritsen, 2003; Cherbonneau & Jacobs, 
2015; Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014; Harris & Clarke, 1991; Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Jacobs, 
Topalli, and Wright, 2003; Roberts & Block, 2013; Sampson, 1987; Topalli, Wright, and 
Fornango, 2002). The remaining UCR Part I offenses of criminal homicide, forcible rape, 
aggravated as assault, and arson do not necessarily have at their core a motivation toward 
acquiring immediate cash. Consequently, I did not include these offenses in the current analysis 
because they did not fit the definition of a street crime for purposes of this evaluation. The street 
crime variable, therefore, is a consolidation of each of the crimes of robbery, burglary, theft, and 
motor vehicle theft reported to the FBI by each state for each year in the study timeframe. 
Robbery  
 The FBI defines robbery as the taking or attempted taking of anything of value from the 
control of a person by force or threat of force or violence and/or by inducing fear in the victim 
(FBI, 2010). One of the most common forms of obtaining cash through crime (Miller, 1998), 
robbery falls squarely into the category of a predatory offense. By its nature robbery implies that 
it might often be driven by monetary gain, and street life participants have been known to 
commit this act as a common method of immediately acquiring cash (Baumer, Horney, Felson, 
& Lauritsen, 2003; Bennett & Wright, 1984; Sampson, 1987; Silverman, 2004; Topalli, Wright, 
and Fornango, 2002; Wright & Decker, 1994). While a robbery can occur for reasons other than 
the acquisition of cash, the research indicates that monetary gain is one prevailing reason for its 
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occurrence (Jacobs & Wright, 1999, Wright & Decker, 1994; Wright, Brookman, & Bennet, 
2006). As such, this offense fit squarely into the definition of a street crime and, as such, I 
included robbery as an outcome variable in this study.  
Burglary 
 Burglary is “the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft” (FBI, 2010). 
The notion that someone would enter a dwelling with the intention of removing something from 
it certainly indicates that burglary has predatory motivations. However, burglary can be far more 
than simply illegally entering a structure and removing something). There is a particular subset 
of burglars who subscribe to street culture and commit this crime with a sense of urgency 
originating from a desperate need for cash (Bennett & Wright, 1984; Blumstein, 1995; Chang, 
2011; Cromwell, Olson, & D'Aunn, 1991; Wilkinson, Kawachi, & Kennedy, 1998; Wright & 
Decker, 1994). Qualitative interviews with active burglars show that these offenders not only 
know when and where to commit their crimes, but also what they expect to take away to include 
cash or items easily converted to cash (Bennett & Wright, 1984, Maguire & Bennett, 1982; 
Wright & Decker, 1994). Not all burglaries occur strictly for cash.  However, because burglary 
can happen as a result of street life involvement and a specific, targeted need for cash, I included 
burglary as an outcome variable.   
Theft 
 Theft is the most frequently occurring of all the Part I offenses (FBI, 2010). Defined as 
the unlawful taking, carrying, leading or riding away of property from the possession or 
constructive possession of another (FBI, 2010), theft takes place for a variety of reasons 
including the conversion of stolen items into cash (Silverman, 2004). It can also occur simply 
through the unlawful taking of cash directly (Silverman, 2004; Sutton, 1999). However, I 
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recognize that not all offenders perpetrate theft as a means of obtaining cash. Scholarly work 
indicates that a considerable portion of reported theft centers around shoplifting (see Bamfield, 
2012) and this particular motivation does not fit within the boundaries of street crime. However, 
while this offense does not necessarily happen for the sole purpose of acquiring cash, it would be 
remiss not to consider that the theft statistics contained in the UCR may be, in some part, 
predatory. With the lessening of available cash due to benefits transfer technology, thefts with 
the intention converting stolen goods to cash, or the straight-out theft of cash itself, should 
decrease. I therefore also included theft in the models tested in this study.  
Auto Theft 
 The FBI categorizes the theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle as motor vehicle theft 
in the UCR (FBI, 2010). There are many reasons for its occurrence.  Motor vehicle theft can be a 
method of exacting revenge, retaliation, expressing dominance, joy-riding, and robbery, (see e.g., 
Cherbonneau & Jacobs, 2015; Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014; Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Jacobs, 
Topalli, and Wright, 2003). Research in this area connects these behaviors and motivations with 
offenders who actively participate in street culture (Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Jacobs, Topalli, & 
Wright, 2003; Wright, Topalli, & Jacques, 2014). Scholars have also considered the act of auto 
theft as a means to attaining cash through either the conversion of stolen goods to usable funds 
through chop shops and underground cash-only markets or resale of the vehicle itself (Harris & 
Clarke, 1991; Roberts & Block, 2013).  In either case, the expectation is that some part of the 
motor vehicle theft rate in each state contains motivations towards obtaining cash. It should, 
therefore, decrease as a function of less cash in circulation and fewer cash-rich buyers. 
Consequently, I included auto theft as an outcome variable in the subsequent models. 
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Drug Violations     
 To test the hypothesis that drugs may act as a possible mechanism for cash-driven crime, 
UCR Part II drug arrest data were collected from the official BJS website. Stated previously, if 
the EBT system is responsible for lesser amounts of circulating cash, then fewer potential 
victims are carrying it.  As a result, there could be less street crime to obtain the cash necessary 
for the purchase of illicit drugs.  
The underlying premise for using this particular drug arrest variable is as follows. Having 
less cash in circulation should adversely affect the drug market. This could occur both in the 
decreasing amount of cash necessary to purchase drugs in the black market and through the 
diminishing number of buyers who can obtain said cash through predatory means. Assuming this 
to be the case, there is the possibility that there could be fewer arrests of people either selling or 
possessing drugs after EBT implementation. While it is also likely that the war on drugs 
simultaneously affected the drug arrest rate, the argument still stands that some portion of any 
effect found in this study may contain elements of the reduction of circulating cash in each state 
post-EBT implementation. Since the data published by BJS specifically contain arrest 
information for individuals either in possession of or selling illicit drugs encompassing both 
sides of the drug market in one statistic, I argue that the drug violation arrests contained in the 
UCR can feasibly represent the drug market. Because Part II crimes are only available through 
the BJS arrest data tool at the agency level year over year, the individual figures were collected 
and aggregated to the state level. This variable served as the dependent variable for the first part 
of the mediator analysis (path a) and the independent variable in the second part of the mediator 
analysis (path b).  
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Independent Variables 
EBT 
Directly measuring the amount of cash in circulation in any area is problematic. The 
Federal Reserve produces estimates at the national level relating to the number of purchases 
made by each payment medium (e.g., cash, check, credit card) and, as expected, cash purchases 
have been gradually declining over time. Unfortunately, disaggregating these data to any 
individual state is not possible because they do not accurately describe the amount of cash in 
circulation and, moreover, the government and private investors hold a significant amount of 
cash outside the US. Research establishes, however, that a key source of circulating cash in 
America is welfare payments (Ford & Beverage, 2004; Rhine & Greene, 2012). Further, the US 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) produces comprehensive and measurable statistics on 
welfare disbursement for each state encompassing the time frame of this study. In lieu of a direct 
measure of circulating cash, one can look to circumstances and characteristics of the economy 
that could serve as a substitution. One such proxy is the implementation of the EBT system. 
Though not a direct measure of the exact reduction in the amount of circulating cash, it is logical 
to assume that its implementation removed some portion of cash from locales where benefits 
distributions are most common. It is, in fact, the geographical and time-related variation of EBT 
implementation that I capitalize on to perform the analysis. Thus, I utilized EBT implementation 
as the key predictor in this study. 
The US Department of Agriculture houses and publishes official benefits statistics, 
including state implementation dates, on their public website. Because EBT implementation in 
most states took place at various times at various intervals, no single point of commencement or 
completion was common to each jurisdiction. For example, the state of Ohio took the longest to 
27 
 
board all its recipients onto the platform. The process took seven years. Further, to establish a 
trend and perform the analysis (see Cameron & Trivedi, 2010), I added in the relevant data for 
five years before and after the implementation process making the total time span of necessary 
data in Ohio consisted of 17 years. Pennsylvania implemented the EBT system in just under a 
year. With five years before and after implementation added in, the total time span for 
Pennsylvania was 11 years. This six-year implementation variance is problematic for properly 
evaluating a difference in differences analysis since each state in the model must contain the 
same number of variables in the same number of observed years. To address this issue, I 
expanded the before and after years in Pennsylvania equally on each side of implementation to 
reach 17 years and align its data with the state of Ohio. I employed the same technique for each 
of the remaining states to form a complete dataset.  
 In essence, this variable acts as an indicator of whether or not a state received the 
treatment. In a general sense, a variable such as EBT implementation would be coded 
dichotomously where if a particular state had boarded its recipients onto the EBT platform that 
state would receive a “1” and if not, a “0”. However, because each state completed the 
implementation process in varying time intervals (between one and seven years), simply coding 
each state in a specific year as either 1 or 0, implemented or not implemented, was not 
appropriate. Instead, I coded EBT implementation a fraction for each observation ranging from 
0.00 to 1.00 representing the proportion of completion over the course of the total 
implementation years. In this way, a coding of zero (0) in a specific year indicates that a state 
had not yet begun implementation. Fractional coding of the EBT variable (e.g., .33, .50, .75) 
indicated that implementation had commenced in a particular year for that state. A coding of one 
(1) designated that the state had fully implemented the system. For example, if a particular state 
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began boarding its recipients in September 2000 and finished in December 2001, implementation 
took a total of 15 months. I would code the EBT variable for the year 1999 as a “0” because 
implementation had not yet begun. The EBT variable in the year 2000 would be coded as “0.20” 
because three of the 15 months it took to implement the system (3/15=0.20) took place in that 
year. Moreover, because the state completed EBT implementation by the end of 2001, I would 
code the EBT variable as a “1” for that year. 3 
Percent Male 
 Males commit the majority of the reported crimes in the US (Carrabine, Iganski, & Lee, 
2004). Estimates in 2011 showed that nearly three-quarters of the persons arrested in 2011 were 
men (FBI, 2011). Research further indicates that individuals engaging in hard-core street life also 
tend to be male (Hallsworth, 2013, Anderson, 1999). Because being male is a consistent 
predictor of crime (particularly violent crime) and participation in street culture, I controlled for 
this characteristic by including a percent male variable in the model. I collected the data for this 
variable from official US Census Bureau, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and individual state 
publications for each year and weighted it by state population. This variable indicates and 
controls for the percentage of males in a particular state in each specific year of the analysis.  
Percent Black 
 Official government statistics show that a substantial portion of arrests in the US are of 
black individuals (FBI, 2016). Between 1988 and 2002, the same basic years the majority of the 
states implemented the EBT program, law enforcement arrested blacks at a higher rate than any 
other ethnicity. This is particularly evident in the crimes of homicide and robbery (FBI, 2016). 
                                                 
3 I acknowledge that this type of coding might be problematic, yet, I also coded the EBT variable as a one as soon as 
the implementation started and also as a zero until implementation was completed. Results varied little in either case 
and were robust to further alternative coding.     
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Because the data utilized in the current research consist of official government records, I 
collected and controlled for the percentage of black for each state and year in the model to avoid 
confounding the findings.  
Population 
 Gathered from official US Census Bureau figures and coupled with individual state data 
reported to the BJS and FBI, I included the population of each state in the analysis. Different 
states are more populous than others and have higher or lower “raw” crime numbers per se (FBI, 
2014). For instance, in 2014, the state of New York had 27,241 robberies where the state of 
Indiana had 7,114. Moreover, each state’s population grows at a different rate. While this 
variable allows for the establishment of each state’s particular crime rate(s) placing them on the 
same metric, it also stands alone as its own influence on the results of the analyses. By 
controlling for each state’s population and rate of growth in the analytical models, the results are 
more precise. I collected this variable as a continuous count of the residents in each state and 
year and included it in the overall dataset.  
Poverty  
 The government designed the welfare system to assist those living below the poverty 
level with, among other things, the supplemental nutrition assistance program (SNAP) (USDA, 
2016). Unfortunately, poverty is also a factor that scholars link to criminal behavior (Brown & 
Males, 2011; Bursik & Grasmick, 1993; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; McBride-Murry et al. 2011; 
Muggah, 2012; Small & Newman, 2001). A significant part of the foundation of this study is 
contingent upon the assumption that EBT system, the primary SNAP benefits disbursement tool, 
reduces the amount of circulating cash. If true, then impoverished conditions could potentially 
confuse the results. I therefore added poverty into the regression equation as a means of 
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controlling its influence on the outcome. The data for this variable came from the U.S. Census 
Bureau yearly figures and recorded as the percentage of residents in a specific state living below 
the poverty line.  
Unemployment 
 Unemployment shares a relationship with poverty and, likewise has been shown to 
influence criminal behavior (Altindag, 2012; Corcoran & Hill, 1980; Heller, 2014; Hooghe, 
Vanhoutte, Hardyns, & Bircan, 2010; Lochner, 2004; McBride et al., 2011; Phillips & Land, 
2012; Raphael & Winter-Ebmer, 2001). Furthermore, a considerable portion of the unemployed 
rely on government assistance to survive, particularly during the time frame when the nation was 
implementing the EBT system (McDonald, 1996; Van Berkel, 2010). Because the focus of this 
study centers on EBT implementation reducing circulating cash and the crime associated with it, 
and that unemployment correlates with criminal behavior, I created an unemployment variable 
and included it in the final analysis to reduce bias in the model. I collected the data to create this 
variable from the official yearly statistics published by the US Census Bureau and entered into 
the dataset as a rate per 100,000 residents.  
High School Education 
In addition to poverty and joblessness, research establishes that a lack of education is also 
a substantial contributor to the crime equation (Altindag, 2012; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; 
Hjalmarsson & Lochner, 2012; Lochner, 2004, 2011; McBride, Berkel, Gaylord‐Harden, 
Copeland‐Linder, & Nation, 2011; Mesters, van der Geest, & Bijleveld, 2016). In short, there is a 
negative correlation between completing high school and criminal behavior where persons with a 
high school education tend to commit less crime and the reverse (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; 
Van Berkel, 2010). Collected from the US Census Bureau, the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
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and the US Department of Education as a percentage of a state’s population with a high school 
diploma, I created and included this variable in the subsequent analyses to avoid confounding the 
final results.  
Imprisonment Rate 
 There is some basis for the notion that incarceration may reduce the crime rate, most 
plausibly through incapacitation (Blumstein & Rosenfeld, 2008; Levitt, 2004; Lynch & Sabol, 
2004; Rosenfeld & Messner, 2009; Spellman, 2006). Evidence produced from a variety of 
studies consistently reveals a negative relationship between incarceration and crime (for a full 
review see Liedka, Piehl, & Useem, 2006). Liedka and colleagues’ (2006) research covering 
three decades of data – including the period for the current study -  indicates not only that as the 
prison population rises crime rates decrease, but also that even in areas with lower levels of 
incarceration its effect on the crime rate has been grossly underestimated. More specific to the 
current research, Lynch and Sabol (2004) conducted research using BJS data and observed that 
nationwide increases in the incarceration rate shared a negative relationship with crime rates 
particularly in disadvantaged neighborhoods, the same areas where government assistance is 
higher.  
Due to these correlations, I created and included an imprisonment variable in the 
regression equations as a control variable. The variable consists of data collected from the BJS’ 
National Prisoner Statistics (NPS) Historical Corrections website.  I incorporated this variable 
into the dataset as a rate for each state encompassing those under the jurisdiction of both federal 
and state correctional authorities. I recognize that private prisons do not necessarily report or 
make available their data. As a consequence, the true incarceration rates could be less than the 
official figures utilized. Even if this is the case, I argue that it would only bias the results in the 
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opposite direction of the analysis. The effect of EBT implementation on crime, therefore, would 
be under-estimated.  
Trend 
 Data comprised of repeated measures over time (panel data) carry with them an inherent 
trend. If the outcome of interest, in this case crime, is growing over time, subsequent regression 
analyses must account for this growth. This is commonly referred to as the trend and is critical to 
difference in differences modeling (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Adding a trend variable to this 
analysis helps control for any exogenous increases in crime unexplained by the variables already 
included in the model. Creating a trend variable consists simply of recording a progressive 
numeric value for each consecutive year in the data set. For instance, if the data for a particular 
analysis began in the year 2000 and ended in 2004, the trend variable would equal “1” for the 
year 2000. A “2” would be recorded for the trend variable in the year 2001 and would increase 
until ending with the value of “5” in 2004.    
Method of Analysis 
Difference in Differences Analysis 
 Criminologists infrequently have access to true experimental data relying more on so-
called “natural” or quasi-experiments (Lum & Yang, 2005; Weisburd & Braga, 2006). Most 
often in these designs, the administration of the treatment was not random, and the researcher did 
not control how that treatment was assigned. This is the case with EBT implementation. Each 
state initiated the system according to their own agenda in their own time. Moreover, these states 
did not publish the reasoning behind their implementation strategies, so it is impossible to know 
how authorities decided when are where to begin. In circumstances such as this, basic regression 
techniques are not always useful, and researchers must look to alternative methods.  
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Difference in differences (DD) analysis is especially advantageous for such situations 
(Abadie, 2005; Alison, 2006; Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). Employing this method produces the 
appropriate counterfactual estimate used to calculate the average treatment effect on the treated 
entities (commonly referred to as the ATT) of an event regardless of non-random treatment 
selection (Roberts, 2015). This makes DD strategies appropriate for the analyses in the current 
study. Moreover, the DD method is designed for aggregate, pooled cross-sectional or 
longitudinal data to observe trends in the outcome variable (in this case crime rates) for two 
groups before and after the intervention (in this case EBT implementation).  
There are essentially three DD methods. The simplest involves conducting a comparison 
of the trends of the outcome variable for both the control and treatment groups before and after 
an event. The outcome estimates of the treatment group before and after the intervention is 
subtracted from the outcome estimate of the control group’s before and after estimates. The two 
differences are then subtracted from each other yielding the difference in the differences estimate 
or the ATT (Card & Krueger, 1994). The drawback of this particular method of DD estimation is 
that it only accounts for variation in the outcome variable with no consideration given to the 
input of other factors, observed or unobserved. This was problematic for the current study 
because I suspected unobserved and unquantifiable influences, such as adherence to street 
culture, might the results of the final analysis. Moreover, for this type of DD analysis to yield a 
proper ATT estimate, a definitive point of treatment for both groups needs to exist. Because EBT 
implementation in most states took longer than one year, no common intervention point for each 
jurisdiction existed.  This, this particular type of DD analysis was not appropriate to conduct the 
analyses in the current study.  
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 Researchers can also estimate the ATT using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression by 
including a specific interaction term. Creating this interaction term consists of multiplying a 
dichotomous variable whether the group received the treatment, (1=yes/0=no) by a dichotomous 
variable indicating if the specific observation occurred before or after the treatment 
(1=yes/0=no). Formally, the equation is such that:   
Yit= β0 + β1*[Time] + β2*[Treatment] + β3*[Time*Treatment] + β4*[Covariates] + εit 
where yit is the outcome variable of interest for the individual unit at a particular point in time.  
The symbol  represents the regression coefficient for each of the independent variables. The 
Treatit variable represents whether or not the individual value was recorded for the treatment or 
control group while Postit indicates whether or not the individual value occurred pre-event or 
post event.  The term it represents the residual error in the equation.  
In principle, this model would produce the ATT estimate through the interaction term 
coefficient (β3). However, one of the weaknesses of OLS regression is that it is open to omitted 
(unobserved) variable bias. While this type of model would estimate of the effect of reducing 
cash through EBT implementation on crime, it would not for exogenous, unobservable 
influences such as sentiment, religious beliefs, culture, or adherence to a particular way of life. 
The model would, therefore, produce inaccurate results by way of omitted variable bias.   
Fixed effects regression analysis, however, is a DD design particularly suited to account 
for omitted variable bias (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). This method is one of the most tested and 
preferred designs for the analysis of panel data where repeated observations occur over time, as 
is the case with the data utilized in the current study (see Alison, 2004). Because I suspect the 
presence and influence of unobservable factors in the analyses performed in this current research, 
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such as adherence to street life, and I am utilizing panel data, I utilize a fixed effects (FE) 
regression design to produce the ATT of reducing cash on street crime.   
Fixed Effects Regression 
 The identifying assumption of fixed effects regression analysis is that unobserved 
variables affect both the left and right side of the equation are time-invariant and can therefore be 
removed by differencing them out of the equation over repeated observations (Alison, 2006). It 
does this by considering only the variation within the individual units of observation (in this case 
the states) over time, not between them. When subtracting each state’s yearly observations from 
their mean before and after implementation, and then regressing the outcome differences on the 
predictor differences, FE eliminates the source of omitted variable bias; that is, unobservable 
cross-state differences in crime (Cameron & Trivedi, 2010; Gardiner, Luo, & Roman, 2009). By 
doing so, the coefficient estimates cannot be biased because the omitted time-invariant 
influences (e.g., culture, religion, etc.) are held fixed.  
For example, the state of Ohio had different rates of crime over a 17-year period 
surrounding EBT implementation. Comparing the variables particular to Ohio to their 17-year 
means produces the within-state variation and accounts for the time-invariant unobserved 
variables. The crime outcome differences are then regressed on the predictor differences 
resulting in the effect estimate in that state. The same is done for every other state included in the 
model until the analysis estimates the final ATT coefficient on the main predictor variable, EBT 
implementation. Employing this design fundamentally eliminates a key source of omitted 
variable bias, the unobserved differences across-states, by removing contamination from 
confounding units of observation (other states) and additional unobserved factors that might 
otherwise produce biased estimates (Alison, 2006). Moreover, FE regressions can provide 
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estimates of count-based differences of either Poisson or negative binomial distributions (Alison, 
2006, Cameron & Trivedi, 2010). But because Poisson regression forces the mean and the 
variance to equal estimates – when in the data used for the current study they are not – the 
appropriate routine for this analysis is the negative binomial distribution.  
Given the above, I chose to perform a FE negative binomial, difference in differences 
regression analysis to produce the ATT of implementing the EBT system on various forms of 
street crime. The final model equation is such that: Crimesy= ݂(αEBTsy + βs + Trendsy + ߝsy).  
Crimesy is the specific street crime rate for state s in the calendar year y. The EBTsy variable is 
the treatment which equals zero if state s did not have the EBT system in effect in the calendar 
year y, a fraction if implementation was in progress and a one if the system was completely in 
effect. The coefficient βs is the state fixed effects vector accounting for any cross-state permanent 
differences that may affect crime. I also incorporate a state-specific yearly time trend variable, 
Trendsy, that accounts for possible non-random variation in the program implementation that 
might be correlated with unobserved factors that vary by state and year, and that might also 
affect crime including population.4  Last, εsy is the idiosyncratic error left over in the equation. 
To ensure that this error is unbiased and uncorrelated within the states, I clustered the standard 
errors at the state level for each year encompassed in the model. This left the remaining 
coefficient of interest, α. Controlling and accounting for each of the other model factors, this 
coefficient is what measures the effect reducing cash through EBT implementation had on crime. 
This coefficient indicates the percent change in the outcome variable given the other factors in 
the model.  
                                                 
4 The regression is weight by annual state population.  
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Note that fixed effects regression has a counterpart, random effects regression. Both 
techniques are appropriate for panel data analysis, but FE analysis allows the free association 
between the error and predictor terms where random effects regression does not. To determine 
the correct design, I employed a Housman specification test of endogeneity that analyzes the 
correlation between the predictor variables and the error term. This procedure tests the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the random effects model are equal to its fixed effects 
counterpart (Alison, 2006). If the test produces a significant p-value, the null hypothesis is 
rejected and indicates that the researcher should utilize a fixed effects model (Alison, 2006). All 
of the models in the current study returned a statistically significant Hausman test p-value 
indicating that fixed effects analyses were appropriate.  
Stage 1: Less Cash, Less Crime Analysis 
 Stated earlier, the first part of the analyses conducted in this study begins as a national 
examination loosely based on the original Missouri study conducted by Wright et al. evaluating 
the effect of EBT implementation on crime. In doing so, I perform an analysis on the entire 
nation to produce the overall effect of reducing cash on street crime. The FE analysis to follow 
capitalizes on the fact that there is variation in the time frame in which the individual states 
implemented EBT. Not all states initiated the system in the same year. This inconsistency is what 
forms the treatment and control states and allows for the estimation of the ATT on the country as 
a whole. 
However, EBT benefits are not distributed evenly across the country. Some states receive 
more SNAP benefits than others. If EBT implementation reduces circulating cash and that 
reduction negatively affects street crime, then the effects should be greater in the states receiving 
more of the benefits than others. While Wright et al. (2017) focused on one specific state where 
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benefits are fairly localized, the current analysis encompasses not only the states receiving 
average benefits, but also the high and low extremes. Adding this more focused analysis to the 
original analysis format provides a more in-depth understanding of how reducing cash affects 
crime by exploring whether states receiving greater amounts of government benefits - in dollars 
issued per the USDA (2016) – might be different from those receiving fewer. Utilizing data from 
the USDA was the most appropriate measure because, first, they are responsible for the national 
distribution of EBT benefits through the SNAP program, and second, the EBT systems is the 
primary independent variable of interest. Thus, I performed FE regression analysis on both the 
top ten5 and bottom ten6 states receiving benefits and compared the results side by side.  
Some studies suggest that street crime is generally considered an urban event (Herbert, 
1982; Krivo & Peterson, 1996). However, the analysis of the top and bottom states receiving 
benefits consists principally of more rural states as defined by the US Census Bureau urban 
density statistics (US Census Bureau, 2000). To strengthen the case that cash connects to street 
crime, I performed an analysis of the top ten urban states and the ten most rural states in the 
country. An analysis of this nature would test whether the cash and street crime connection holds 
true on a more granular level. While it is true that street crime does not necessarily have to be an 
urban event, enough research exists to justify that a significant portion of this type of offending 
occurs in this environment (Anderson, 1999; Shover & Honaker, 1992). If the less cash, less 
crime hypothesis holds true, and assuming this is a model that best fits in the analysis of street 
offending, there should be a greater effect in the more urban7 states compared to the more rural8 
                                                 
5 Texas, California, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Georgia, and Tennessee. 
6 District of Columbia, Rhode Island, Montana, Delaware, South Dakota, Alaska, New Hampshire, Vermont, North 
Dakota, and Wyoming. 
7 District of Columbia, California, New Jersey, Hawaii, Nevada, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Florida, Arizona, and 
Utah. 
8 Vermont, Maine, West Virginia, Mississippi, South Dakota, Arkansas, Montana, Alabama, Kentucky, and North 
Dakota. 
39 
 
states. Thus, an exploration of the effects of EBT implementation in both urban and rural areas 
yields a more complete understanding as to how it affects street crime in these environments. In 
testing this notion, I conducted the same regressions as previous and made side-by-side 
comparisons of these two groups. 
Finally, if reducing circulating cash also reduces street crime, then it should also be the 
case that states with different levels of street crime will be affected differently as a result of EBT 
implementation. In the last part of the stage one analyses, I test for differences between the states 
with the highest levels of street crime9 in comparison to the states with the lowest levels10 of 
street crime. Performing an analysis of this nature could point out the types of crimes most 
affected by a reduction in circulating cash in areas with specific levels of EBT implementation 
offending levels. A design of this nature allows for a sharper focus on the cash and crime 
connection in areas of varying crime levels. Again, I conducted regression analyses and 
compared top street crime states against bottom street crime states side by side.  
The results of each of these analyses subsequently open the door for the second stage of 
this study’s analytical strategy: That is, a test of whether drugs have a mediating effect between 
cash and street crime.  
Stage 2:  Path Analysis of Drugs as a Mediator 
The next stage of the overall analysis was to determine whether drugs could be acting as 
one possible underlying mechanism for the commission of crime to obtain the necessary cash for 
                                                 
9 District of Columbia, Florida, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Maryland, Hawaii, South Carolina, Louisiana, and 
Oregon. 
10 New Hampshire, North Dakota, Virginia, South Dakota, Maine, Vermont, West Virginia, Iowa, Kentucky, and 
Wisconsin. 
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their purchase. The method used to evaluate this hypothesis was a path analysis utilizing Sobol’s 
test of significance (STS).11 Figure 2 illustrates this strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Sobel’s Test of Drugs as a Mediator 
Formally, Sobel’s test of mediation is a path analysis formulated such that: 
Z = ௔∗௕ඥሼሾ௕మ∗ௌா௔మሺ௔ሻሿାሾ௔మ∗ௌா௕మሺ௕ሻሿሽ             
where ܽ represents the standardized beta coefficient value of EBT implementation regressed on 
drug arrests holding fixed each of the control variables, ܾ represents the standard beta coefficient 
value for drug arrests regressed on crime holding fixed each of the control variables, and SE 
represents the standard errors of the individual regressions. The symbol c represents the direct 
effect coefficient of crime regressed on cash (EBT implementation) holding fixed each of the 
control variables. Converting the Z score to a p-value determines the strength of drugs as a 
mediator. A significant p-value indicates that drugs are, in fact, the mechanism between cash and 
crime.  
 
                                                 
11 See Baron, R. M. & Kenny, D.A. (1986) for a full explanation of tests of mediation.   
Drugs 
ܽ ܾ
Cash c Crime 
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Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Street Crime rate 4142.59 1278.53 1786 10751
Robbery rate 143.68 141.63 6 1266
Burglary rate 851.3 328.24 308 2171
Larceny rate 2727.67 749.69 1336 5834
Auto theft rate 420.08 252.79 75 1840
Percent black 10.83 11.62 0.3 65.8
Percent male 49.63 14.73 46 48.2
Percent high school education 71.48 9.08 47.56 95.1
Percent below poverty 12.74 3.39 5.6 23.9
Unemployment rate 5.23 1.52 2.2 13.1
Imprisonment rate 367.67 205.84 59 1712
Population 5405138.5 6125711.64 453588 37683933
CHAPTER IV 
Results 
National Analysis  
Descriptive Results 
 Evaluating the effect of reducing the amount of circulating cash on street crime begins 
with describing the data. Table 1 depicts the summary statistics for the national analysis and 
displays each variable’s mean, standard deviation, and range for each state encompassing the 
five years before and after complete EBT implementation. Thus, the total end-to-end time frame 
for the entire study spans from 1984 and 2009. 12 At the national level, the mean rates of street 
crime, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft were 4142.59, 143.68, 851.30, 2727.67, and 
420.08, respectively. The nation’s mean percent black population was 10.83% and gender 
distribution was approximately even (males = 49.63%). The mean high school education 
percentage was 71.48% over the course of the study, and the mean rate of persons living in 
poverty was 12.74% nationally. The country’s mean unemployment rate was 5.23 with a national 
imprisonment rate of 367.67. Finally, the nation’s mean population was 5,405,138.50.  
Table 1: US Overall Descriptive Statistics, 1984-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Because the last state converted to the EBT system on 2005, data were collected until 2009 to allow for analysis 
five years before and after throughout the study.  
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The last variable in the model was EBT implementation, which served as a proxy for the 
reduction of circulating cash. Each state executed EBT rollout in various years across the study 
and took varying lengths of time to completely onboard each of their respective recipients. 
Figure 3 depicts in gray the years each state began and completed the switch to the EBT system.  
Maryland was the first to initiate the switch from paper checks to the electronic benefits system 
in 1989; even before Congress made it mandatory. The remaining states followed accordingly 
with California the last to fully convert in 2004. This state-by-state implementation variation in 
the time line what I capitalize upon to perform the FE difference in differences regressions to 
follow and produce the ATT.   
 
Figure 3:  State by State EBT Implementation Timeline. 
State 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Maryland
New Mexico
Minnesota
Ohio
New Jersey
Texas
South Carolina
Wyoming
Utah
North Dakota
South Dakota
Kansas
Illinois
Louisiana
Colorado
Connecticutt
Alabama
Massachusetts
Missouri
Oklahoma
Georgia
Arkansas
Idaho
Oregon
Florida
Pennsylvania
Alaska
Hawaii
North Carolina
District of Columbia
Rhode Island
Vermont
Arizona
New Hampshire
Tennessee
New York
Washington
Kentucky
Wisconsin
Michigan
Indiana
Nevada
Virginia
Montana
Nebraska
Mississippi
California
West Virginia
Maine
Delaware
Iowa
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Regression Results 
The regression results displayed in Table 2 are a representation of the effect of reducing 
circulating cash on street crime nationwide. Included in the model are the estimate (regression 
coefficient), the standard error, and the R-squared value, in addition to the model diagnostic 
value represented by the F statistic and its significance with standard asterisk notation. The first 
EBT column depicts the direct effect of implementation alone on the outcome variables of 
overall street crime, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. The second EBT column includes 
the control variables. The third EBT column incorporates not only the control variables but also a 
linear trend variable. As noted earlier, the trend variable controls some of the omitted time-
invariant bias that the model might otherwise contain when performing FE regression 
techniques. Moreover, it yields the most conservative estimate when accounting for the omitted 
variable bias. Although adding the trend variable reduces the effect size and sometimes causes it 
to become non-significant due to its accounting for endogeneity in the model, this estimate is the 
most appropriate as it includes as many of the factors that could influence a change in crime as a 
result of reducing cash in circulation. As such, the interpretations of the results that follow refer 
to the full model with control and linear trend variables included. Finally, for ease of reading, in 
this particular column, I bolded the regression coefficient estimates that were significant as noted 
by the p-value asterisks super scripted above them. 
This phase of the analysis indicates that EBT implementation was responsible for a 1.3% 
nationwide reduction in street crime. Each of the other crime outcomes also significantly 
declined. Nationally, the reduction of cash through the electronic payments system had the 
greatest effect on burglary (4.4%) while larceny was the least affected (1.6%). Robbery and auto 
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Offense EBT EBT EBT
Street Crime Estimate -0.099*** -0.084*** -0.013*
S.E. 0.003 0.004 0.005
R-squared 0.562 0.617 0.709
F statistic 1047.73*** 162.86*** 218.76***
Robbery Estimate -0.100*** -0.065*** -0.031***
S.E. 0.005 0.007 0.001
R-squared 0.308 0.400 0.414
F statistic 363.45*** 67.28*** 63.56***
Burglary Estimate -0.133*** -0.105*** -0.044***
S.E. 0.004 0.005 0.007
R-squared 0.550 0.660 0.700
F statistic 1001.79*** 191.83*** 214.21***
Larceny Estimate -0.088*** -0.080*** -0.016**
S.E. 0.003 0.004 0.005
R-squared 0.490 0.540 0.648
F statistic 790.63*** 118.37*** 164.98***
Auto Theft Estimate -0.093*** -0.086*** -0.035**
S.E. 0.006 0.008 0.012
R-squared 0.180 0.250 0.330
F statistic 240.92*** 43.61*** 44.18***
Direct Effects Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes
Linear Trends No No Yes
theft also declined by 3.1% and 3.5%, respectively, as a result of the switch from paper checks to 
the EBT system.  
Table 2:  EBT Effects on US Street Crime(s) Nationally, 1984-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These outcomes, however, are contingent upon the assumption that each state’s pre-
treatment outcome trends were moving in parallel. By including a linear trend variable in the 
model, I loosely controlled for unobserved variables (e.g. state specific policies or 
characteristics) that move linearly over time. Strictly speaking, incorporating a trend variable 
into the model relaxes the parallel trends assumption and the results could be considered valid 
with the inclusion of this variable alone. Yet, I went further in testing the parallel trends 
assumption by conducting an event study analysis.  
45 
 
At its core, an event study analysis allows the treatment – in this case EBT 
implementation –  to affect the outcome variable in the pre-treatment years as a type of placebo 
test, removing any pre-existing differences between the treatment and control groups. But EBT 
implementation took some states longer to complete than others. While defining the exact pre-
treatment, and post treatment years for this test in all 50 states was straightforward, the treatment 
needed to be one definitive unit - for purposes of this study, within one calendar year. For 
example, the state of Utah began EBT implementation in October of calendar year 1995 and 
completed the process in April 1996. While they did complete the process in less than one year, 
the process spanned two calendar years. Thus, I could not determine one calendar year in which 
the treatment occurred and consequently, the pretreatment trend years are ambiguous. Because I 
am utilizing end of calendar year data, selecting the state of Utah would have unnecessarily 
biased the results of the event study. In contrast, the state of Rhode Island implemented and 
completed the process entirely in the calendar year1998 allowing for a definitive treatment point 
and a “clean” pre-treatment trend. Of all 50 states and the District of Columbia, 16 of them13 
began and completed14 EBT implementation within one calendar year (see Figure 3). Although it 
would have been helpful to have included every state in the event history analyses, the data at 
hand prohibit a full test of the parallel trends assumption but I argue that a sample of nearly half 
could act as a proxy for the country in general.    
The first part of the event history analysis consists of creating dummy variables for the 
five years prior (P1, P2, P3, P4, and P5) and post EBT implementation (D1, D2, D3, D4, and 
D5). I then performed individual analyses regressing each of the outcome crimes onto the 
                                                 
13 Alabama, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Rhode Island, and Vermont. 
 
14 Some states included in the event study took slightly over one year but not so much as to detract from the results.    
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Street Crime Coef SE Sig.
EBT -0.063 0.042 0.136 -0.146 0.020
P5 0.048 0.042 0.253 -0.035 0.131
P4 0.033 0.042 0.434 -0.050 0.116
P3 0.021 0.042 0.621 -0.062 0.104
P2 0.010 0.042 0.805 -0.072 0.093
P1 (Omitted)
D1 0.048 0.042 0.253 -0.035 0.131
D2 0.031 0.042 0.459 -0.051 0.114
D3 0.017 0.042 0.696 -0.066 0.099
D4 0.012 0.042 0.773 -0.071 0.095
D5 (Omitted)
Constant 3.608 0.030 0.000 3.550 3.667
Observations 230
Clusters 18
95% Conf. Interval
dichotomous EBT implementation variable while including the newly created dummy variables. 
The p-values of the P1 through P5 variable in the results act as an indicator of whether the pre-
treatment trends were parallel. If these p-values turned out to be statistically significant, the 
parallel assumption fails indicating that some exogenous variable was driving the reductions 
found in the nationwide examination. Nevertheless, the results of the event study indicated that 
the parallel trends assumption held for each of the crimes under analysis (see Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 
and 7).  
Table 3:  Event Study Results for Street Crime Analysis 1984-2009 
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Robbery Coef SE Sig.
EBT -0.037 0.136 0.788 -0.303 0.230
P5 0.033 0.136 0.810 -0.234 0.299
P4 0.029 0.136 0.833 -0.238 0.295
P3 0.023 0.136 0.865 -0.243 0.290
P2 0.016 0.136 0.906 -0.250 0.283
P1 (Omitted)
D1 0.018 0.136 0.896 -0.249 0.284
D2 -0.011 0.136 0.934 -0.278 0.255
D3 -0.001 0.136 0.992 -0.268 0.265
D4 -0.010 0.136 0.939 -0.277 0.256
D5 (Omitted)
Constant 1.885 0.096 0.000 1.697 2.074
Observations 230
Clusters 18
95% Conf. Interval
Burglary Coef SE Sig.
EBT -0.064 0.050 0.203 -0.162 0.035
P5 0.081 0.050 0.107 -0.018 0.179
P4 0.057 0.050 0.260 -0.042 0.155
P3 0.034 0.050 0.500 -0.065 0.132
P2 0.016 0.050 0.755 -0.083 0.114
P1 (Omitted)
D1 0.043 0.050 0.387 -0.055 0.142
D2 0.026 0.050 0.603 -0.072 0.125
D3 0.012 0.050 0.808 -0.086 0.111
D4 0.005 0.050 0.924 -0.094 0.103
D5 (Omitted)
Constant 2.855 0.036 0.000 2.786 2.925
Observations 230
Clusters 18
95% Conf. Interval
Table 4:  Event Study Results for Robbery Analysis, 1984-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Event Study Results for Burglary Analysis, 1984-2009 
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Theft Coef SE Sig.
EBT -0.067 0.034 0.048* -0.133 -0.001
P5 0.035 0.034 0.304 -0.032 0.101
P4 0.023 0.034 0.496 -0.043 0.089
P3 0.015 0.034 0.653 -0.051 0.082
P2 0.008 0.034 0.817 -0.059 0.074
P1 (Omitted)
D1 0.055 0.034 0.105 -0.012 0.121
D2 0.038 0.034 0.258 -0.028 0.105
D3 0.022 0.034 0.512 -0.044 0.089
D4 0.019 0.034 0.581 -0.048 0.085
D5 (Omitted)
Constant 3.416 0.024 0.000 3.369 3.463
Observations 230
Clusters 18
95% Conf. Interval
Auto Theft Coef SE Sig. % Conf. Interval
EBT -0.048 0.080 0.550 -0.205 0.109
P5 0.033 0.080 0.680 -0.124 0.190
P4 0.031 0.080 0.700 -0.126 0.188
P3 0.021 0.080 0.790 -0.136 0.178
P2 0.003 0.080 0.970 -0.154 0.160
P1 (Omitted)
D1 0.030 0.080 0.708 -0.127 0.187
D2 0.009 0.080 0.909 -0.148 0.166
D3 -0.005 0.080 0.948 -0.162 0.152
D4 0.006 0.080 0.939 -0.151 0.163
D5 (Omitted)
Constant 2.498 0.057 0.000 2.387 2.609
Observations 230
Clusters 18
Table 6: Event Study Results for Theft Analysis, 1984-2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Event Study Results for Auto Theft Analysis, 1984-2009 
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Benefits Comparison Analysis 
If switching from paper checks to the EBT system reduces the amount of circulating cash 
and subsequently decreases street crime, then its effect should be larger in the states receiving the 
most benefits and lower in the states receiving the least amount of benefits. The government 
distributes SNAP benefits through the EBT program which make up a large portion of the total 
welfare disbursements transferred to recipients through the system. The USDA publishes state by 
state annual reports on SNAP distribution and lists the number of total benefits dollars 
distributed to each state. From these reports, I determined the top ten states with the most and 
least amounts of SNAP benefits distribution by total benefits dollars15 in each state. Texas, 
California, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Georgia, and Tennessee 
were consistently the top ten states receiving the most benefits while the District of Columbia, 
Rhode Island, Montana, Delaware, South Dakota, Alaska, New Hampshire, Vermont, North 
Dakota, and Wyoming made up the bottom ten states.16 Again, I included the five years before 
each states implementation for trending purposes. These data spanned from 1989 to 2009. With 
the data in place, I ran both descriptive and FE DD analyses on the top ten states receiving SNAP 
benefits and then on the ten states receiving the least amount of SNAP benefits and compared the 
results side by side.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 The USDA lists not only each state’s disbursements in total dollars, but also by number of households and number 
of individuals within each state. While I used total dollars to rank each state top to bottom, had I used either of the 
other two metrics the list ranking for the top and bottom ten states would have remained the same. 
16 The order of these states did not appreciably change year over year during the time frame in this study. 
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Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Street Crime rate 4342.34 (1220) 2149 7983 3745.33 (1729.42) 1785 10751
Robbery rate 210.51 (80.38) 112 597 137.42 (271.56) 6 1266
Burglary rate 919.19 (345.10) 336 2171 653.88 (331.50) 308 2074
Larceny rate 2700.55 (725.88) 1506 4574 2585.92 (867.58) 1336 5834
Auto theft rate 512.19 (164.10) 129 944 368.24 (398.73) 95 1840
Percent black 14.25 (5.49) 5.80 29.80 9.24 (18.03) 0.30 65.80
Percent male 48.74 (0.55) 47.69 50.50 49.36 (1.41) 46.00 53.00
Percent high school education 66.33 (7.78) 50.40 79.97 74.88 (7.82) 58.90 89.92
Percent below poverty 13.58 (2.22) 9.50 19.60 11.78 (3.04) 5.60 21.90
Unemployment rate 5.70 (1.43) 3.30 12.10 5.02 (1.72) 2.50 9.30
Imprisonment rate 408.87 (116.65) 187 754 384.06 (358.67) 63 1712
Population 14,711,104 (8,028,854) 4,953,000 37,683,933 759,356 (220,339) 453,588 1,314,895
Top SNAP States Botton SNAP States
Table 8:  Descriptive Results for Top and Bottom SNAP States, 1989 - 2009 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 8 illustrates the descriptive results of each predictor or control variable in the 
model. With the exception of high school education, and percent male, the mean values for each 
variable in the top SNAP states were higher than those of the bottom SNAP receiving states. 
This indicated that the states receiving the most benefits not only had higher rates of predatory 
crime(s) but also had higher levels of the known predictors of these crimes. Taken together, it 
seemed probable that the effect of EBT implementation on street crimes would be greater in the 
areas where SNAP was most prominent. And, in fact, the results that follow confirmed this 
assumption (see Table 9).  
 The results displayed in Table 9 demonstrate that this model, as with the previous 
models, had a significant F statistic values (p < .001) verifying the validity of the variables 
included in the regressions to predict the outcome. The regression results in this analysis 
demonstrate significant reductions in every street crime in the ten states receiving the most 
benefits.17 In comparison to the 1.3% decrease in the national model, overall street crime 
dropped 3.2%, nearly three times as much. The results of robbery were similar.  Where EBT 
implementation reduced robbery across the country by 3.1%, robbery decreased by 9.5% in the 
                                                 
17 A variance inflation factor analysis indicated multicollinearity between the imprisonment rate and the percentage 
of black individuals in this sample. As a result, the imprisonment rate was dropped from the equation.   
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top SNAP states.  A similar pattern continued burglary (4.4% compared to 7.0%), larceny (1.6% 
compared to 3.9%), and auto theft (3.5% compared to 5.0%) indicating the effect of reducing 
circulating cash on street crime both individually and in the aggregate, was stronger in the states 
receiving the most benefits as opposed to the US as a whole. Moreover, compared to the states 
receiving the least amount of SNAP benefits, the reduction of circulating cash through the EBT 
system did not significantly affect any of the crime outcomes. While the R-squared values on the 
bottom ten SNAP states in both robbery and auto theft were less that .50, indicating that less than 
half of the variance in the outcomes were explained by the models utilized, the fact that each of 
the values in every other crime outcome were well above .70 demonstrates that the overall model 
fit is generally robust.    
 However, one could argue that most of the states in this analysis are rural and street crime 
typically occurs in urban environments (Hallsworth, 2013; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Linton et 
al., 2014; Martinez, 2014; Sampson, 2013; Silverman, 2004; Willits, Broidy, & Denman, 2013). 
Consequently, it could be that the results of this part of the analysis contain some manner of 
selection bias. Thus, I continued to interrogate the cash and crime relationship through a 
comparison of the country’s most urban and rural states.  
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EBT EBT EBT EBT EBT EBT
Street Crime Estimate -0.128*** -0.103*** -.032* -0.116*** -0.066*** 0.002
S.E. 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.007 0.011 0.012
R-squared 0.663 0.754 0.787 0.640 0.735 0.819
F statistic 313.45*** 58.16*** 70.42*** 282.14*** 60.52*** 86.39***
Robbery Estimate -0.186*** -0.157*** -0.095*** -0.047*** -0.056* -0.014
S.E. 0.011 0.017 0.024 0.014 0.024 0.029
R-squared 0.649 0.731 0.752 0.069 0.165 0.201
F statistic 294.49*** 51.68*** 50.74*** 11.76*** 4.31*** 4.23***
Burglary Estimate -0.168*** -0.121*** -0.070*** -0.149***-0.0627*** -0.011
S.E. 0.010 0.014 0.020 0.012 0.015 0.018
R-squared 0.662 0.770 0.788 0.509 0.740 0.775
F statistic 312.55*** 63.73*** 62.33*** 165.03*** 62.32*** 57.71***
Larceny Estimate -0.101*** -0.080*** -0.039** -0.119*** -0.063*** -0.007
S.E. 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.008 0.012 0.013
R-squared 0.589 0.704 0.732 0.609 0.724 0.798
F statistic 227.50*** 45.27*** 45.88*** 247.40*** 57.34*** 66.48***
Auto Theft Estimate -0.191*** -0.189*** -0.050* -0.083*** -0.044* -0.010
S.E. 0.013 0.021 0.027 0.012 0.019 0.023
R-squared 0.569 0.658 0.743 0.233 0.448 0.470
F statistic 210.24*** 36.61*** 48.45*** 48.17*** 15.45*** 14.88***
Direct Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Linear Trends No No Yes No No Yes
Top 10 SNAP States Bottom 10 SNAP States
Table 9:  Fixed Effects Results for Top and Bottom SNAP states, 1989 - 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Urban and Rural Comparison  
If it is true that street crime is a marker of urban density, then it should be that EBT 
implementation will have a greater effect in the most urban states in comparison to their rural 
counterparts. Consequently, I conducted regression analyses on the ten most urban (District of 
Columbia, California, New Jersey, Hawaii, Nevada, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Florida, 
Arizona, Utah) and the ten most rural (Vermont, Maine, West Virginia, Mississippi, South 
Dakota, Arkansas, Montana, Alabama, Kentucky, North Dakota) states by urban percentage of 
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the population according to the US Census Bureau at the time of EBT implementation. Tables 10 
and 11 list the comparative results.  
Table 10:  Descriptive Results for Urban and Rural States, 1989 - 2009 
 
 Unsurprisingly, the mean crime outcomes in Table 10 were higher in the urban states. 
The imprisonment rate in urban areas was also notably higher as was the percentage of black 
residents, as prior research would suggest (Fischer, 2003; Percival, 2010).18 Scholarly literature 
additionally suggests that rural states should have higher basic education levels (Ladson-Billings, 
2006) and was also the case in this study as the high school education percentage in the rural 
states was greater than the urban states. As expected, the mean population in the urban states was 
nearly four times higher (7,648567.44) than in the rural states (1,973,521.64); by definition, this 
should be the case.  The percentage of males, however was just slightly higher in the rural states 
(51.57%) as opposed to the urban states (49.17%). The descriptive results of the remaining 
variables were approximately the same for both groups.  
 
 
                                                 
18 Once again diagnostics tests on the data prior to the analysis revealed significant multicollinearity between the 
imprisonment rate and percentage of black residents in the urban states. To address this, I removed imprisonment 
rate from the model in this phase of the research which eliminated this issue. 
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Street Crime rate 4945.81 1723.73 2479.604 10751.08 3359.59 837.37 1895 5319
Robbery rate 237.40 247.54 44 1266 58.13 48.75 6 186
Burglary rate 966.00 362.84 448 2171 685.55 258.55 309 1292
Larceny rate 3045.39 1066.67 1524 5834 2194.46 496.84 1336 3834
Auto theft rate 697.18 339.02 238 1840 205.01 83.63 75 489
Percent black 11.82 16.84 0.7 65.8 9.14 12.11 0.30 37.00
Percent male 49.17 1.47 46 55.46 51.57 33.12 47.74 482.00
Percent high school education 70.24 10.00 47.56 95.1 74.24 9.27 55.50 89.92
Percent below poverty 12.21 3.10 7.8 21.9 14.89 3.24 8.70 23.00
Unemployment rate 5.56 1.83 2.4 13.1 5.09 1.51 2.50 10.70
Imprisonment rate 438.16 347.86 121 1712 324.34 168.48 63.00 749.00
Population 7648567.44 10092574.52 519000 37683933 1973521.64 1329045.95 562758 4599030
Top Rural StatesTop Urban States
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Offense EBT EBT EBT EBT EBT EBT
Street Crime Estimate -0.143*** -0.129*** 0.010 0.0716*** -0.0372*** 0.005
S.E. 0.008 0.010 0.015 0.006 0.010 0.012
R-squared 0.667 0.736 0.831 0.462 0.550 0.627
F statistic 319.10 61.06*** 93.74*** 137.04*** 23.19*** 28.19***
Robbery Estimate -0.143*** -0.112*** -0.084*** -0.023 0.010 -0.005
S.E. 0.011 0.014 0.023 0.012 0.018 0.022
R-squared 0.511 0.643 0.652 0.023 0.223 0.230
F statistic 165.96*** 39.31*** 31.46*** 3.76* 5.46*** 5.02***
Burglary Estimate -0.193*** -0.174*** -0.062** -0.076*** -0.042** -0.021
S.E. 0.011 0.013 0.019 0.008 0.013 0.015
R-squared 0.665 0.771 0.831 0.364 0.466 0.487
F statistic 315.80*** 73.48*** 82.22*** 91.14*** 16.61*** 15.90***
Larceny Estimate -0.138*** -0.119*** -0.010 0.069*** -0.044*** 0.005
S.E. 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.007 0.012 0.013
R-squared 0.665 0.725 0.841 0.364 0.441 0.569
F statistic 315.19*** 57.49*** 88.66*** 90.83*** 15.01*** 22.18***
Auto Theft Estimate -0.085*** -0.094*** -0.025 -0.067*** -0.025 -0.011
S.E. 0.017 0.023 0.037 0.010 0.014 0.017
R-squared 0.134 0.274 0.337 0.226 0.484 0.492
F statistic 24.65*** 8.25*** 8.54*** 46.50*** 17.85*** 16.22***
Direct Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Linear Trends No No Yes No No Yes
Top Urban States Top Rural States
Table 11:  Fixed Effects Results for Urban and Rural States, 1989 - 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 illustrates the regression analyses results. If, as some scholars propose, street 
life and street crime are an urban phenomenon (Hallsworth, 2013; Vigil, 2010) and dependent on 
cash (Jacobs & Wright, 1999; Wright et al., 2017), then reducing the amount of cash in 
circulation should have a stronger effect on crime in urban states in comparison to their rural 
equivalents. The findings depicted in Table 11 partially support this supposition. The model 
diagnostics, again, indicated the model fit was satisfactory with all F-statistics being statistically 
significant. Primarily, decreasing the amount of circulating cash significantly reduced robbery 
and burglary in the most urban states yet these effects were not strong enough to make the 
aggregated street crime variable significantly reduced. The model demonstrated that the EBT 
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shift was responsible for a decline in robbery of 8.4% and burglary dropped by 6.2% adding 
further support to the notion that reducing cash in a specific environment, such as urban areas 
where street life is endorsed, can lower the amount of predatory crime associated with it. 
Moreover, as with the lowest SNAP recipient states, the EBT shift did not affect any of the crime 
outcomes in the rural states thus adding further strength to the notion.  
Street crime: High and Low-Level analysis 
The last test was to examine how EBT implementation affected the states with the most 
street crime19 as opposed to the states with the least amounts.20 By dividing the groups in this 
way, I expected the distribution of the significant effects to be spread evenly across them rather 
than more present in one over the other. Conducting this type of comparison shed light on the 
offenses most affected by the reduction of cash in high street crime states in comparison to low 
street crime states. Table 12 depicts the descriptive results of this analysis. 
Table 12:  Descriptive Results for Top and Bottom Street Crime States, 1985 - 2008 
 
 
                                                 
19 The District of Columbia, Florida, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas, Maryland, Hawaii, South Carolina, Louisiana, 
and Oregon. 
20 New Hampshire, North Dakota, Virginia, South Dakota, Maine, Vermont, West Virginia, Iowa, Kentucky, and 
Wisconsin. 
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Street Crime rate 5756.74 1248.57 3815 10751 2760.75 469.56 1785 4225
Robbery rate 256.79 242.72 68 1266 130.55 69.56 34 410
Burglary rate 1204.82 324.71 615 2171 540.89 136.50 308 1087
Larceny rate 3625.25 637.68 2504 5834 1996.46 344.86 1336 2920
Auto theft rate 669.98 325.42 319 1840 177.63 63.50 75 432
Percent black 18.22 18.06 1.5 65.8 4.16 5.67 0.3 20.88
Percent male 48.91 0.96 46 51.15 49.26 0.54 47.74 51.34
Percent high school education 63.72 6.94 48 86.79 78.21 6.23 62.3 89.92
Percent below poverty 15.12 3.85 7.9 23.9 11.75 3.23 5.6 19.9
Unemployment rate 5.81 1.41 2.4 9.4 4.50 1.40 2.2 8.7
Imprisonment rate 517.58 338.38 147 1712 258.88 114.91 63 513
Population 5955489 6072132 519000 22928508 2578490 2167777 562758 8023953
Top 10  Street Crime States Bottom 10  Street Crime States
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The means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum crime outcomes were, not 
unexpectedly, all higher in the top street crime states. The top states were also higher in terms of 
race, poverty, unemployment, imprisonment, and overall population. The bottom street crime 
states had a higher percentage of the population with a high school education while the 
percentage of male residents in each group was relatively equal.  
 Table 13: Fixed Effects Results for Top and Bottom Street Crime States, 1985 - 2008 
 
I next performed the FE regression analyses on both groups and displayed the results in 
Table 13. Side by side comparisons partially confirmed that EBT implementation affected 
individual street crimes differently in areas with varying levels of criminal behavior. In the states 
with the highest levels of street crime, reducing cash effected burglary and auto theft. Burglary 
Offense EBT EBT EBT EBT EBT EBT
Street Crime Estimate -0.100*** -0.048*** -0.022 -0.081*** -0.034*** 0.025
S.E. 0.007366 0.010 0.014 0.007 0.010 0.010
R-squared 0.53608 0.714 0.724 0.487 0.619 0.744
F statistic 183.73*** 47.46 44.11*** 150.91*** 30.86*** 48.77***
Robbery Estimate -0.121*** -0.044* -0.009 0.002 0.057** 0.041*
S.E. 0.013 0.019 0.025 0.011 0.018 0.022
R-squared 0.362 0.519 0.532 0.000 0.212 0.220
F statistic 90.15*** 20.48*** 19.10*** 0.027 5.11*** 4.74***
Burglary Estimate -0.173*** -0.109*** -0.056*** -0.087*** -0.036** -0.001
S.E. 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.009 0.013 0.015
R-squared 0.690 0.826 0.855 0.377 0.564 0.608
F statistic 353.75*** 90.16*** 98.98*** 96.044*** 24.59*** 26.00***
Larceny Estimate -0.089*** -0.051*** -0.002 -0.082*** -0.037** 0.014
S.E. 0.008 0.011 0.014 0.007 0.011 0.011
R-squared 0.441 0.626 0.685 0.457 0.565 0.698
F statistic 125.23*** 31.74*** 36.56*** 133.83*** 24.67*** 38.81***
Auto Theft Estimate -0.032* 0.071*** 0.049* -0.081*** -0.008 0.027
S.E. 0.014 0.019 0.026 0.011 0.016 0.018
R-squared 0.032 0.389 0.396 0.250 0.519 0.554
F statistic 5.26* 12.07*** 10.98*** 53.08*** 20.52*** 20.88***
Direct Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Linear Trends No No Yes No No Yes
Top Street Crime States Bottom Street Crime States
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decreased by 5.6%; however, auto theft increased by 4.9%. In the states with the least amount of 
street crime, robbery increased by 4.1% after EBT implementation. The switch to electronic 
payments had no significant effect in either group on overall street crime or larceny.  
Path Analysis:  Drugs as a Mediator 
 While the findings in the stage one analyses demonstrated that reducing the amount of 
circulating cash significantly affects different street crimes under various conditions, the second 
stage analysis testing drugs as the mechanism for predatory criminal behavior was inconclusive. 
Although several data sets exist both restricted and unrestricted, no one collection lent itself 
easily to the analysis at hand.  The primary issues with most data (i.e. ADAM, TEDS) centered 
around either time frames that did not coincide with that used in the first stage of the current 
research, figures that weakly represented the drug market, or data that I could not adequately 
define as belonging to a specific location. Because of these issues and the fact that I utilized 
UCR Part I statistics in the first stages of this analysis, I chose the UCR Part II crime of drug 
violation arrests as a proxy for the drug market. As stated earlier, these violations encompass 
both sides of the drug market, sale and possession. It could be, then, that these data represent in 
some manner the effect of reduction cash on the drug market and subsequently on the crimes 
committed to obtain them. Unfortunately, once collected, these data were also unsuitable for 
analysis. 
The root cause was the amount of missingness in the available drug data. Previously 
discussed, one of the principal concerns with using UCR Part I statistics was inconsistent 
reporting which lead to some measure of missingness (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008). Regrettably, this 
issue in the UCR Part II data was more extreme, especially concerning the drug violations data. 
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This caused two insurmountable problems prohibiting the analysis and production of meaningful 
results.  
 First, UCR reporting is voluntary (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008; FBI, 2004). Reporting data to 
the FBI often requires that agencies absorb the costs of employing a person to collate and 
transmit monthly figures. A large portion of police agencies in the US are rural and tend to have 
limited staff and constrained budgets (Carson, 2014). As such, they regularly direct available 
resources toward equipment, maintenance, competitive salaries, and other demands necessary to 
sustain a working police department rather than on voluntary tasks (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008; Maltz, 
1999). If an agency chooses to report their statistics, they tend to report the more serious Part I 
offenses with less time spent on reporting minor offenses resulting in a large amount of 
missingness in the Part II data figures (Maltz, 1999). In fact, after inspecting every individual US 
agency’s contribution to their respective state’s yearly drug arrest numbers,21 the amount of 
missingness was higher than the accepted 20% rule recommended by Lynch and Jarvis (2008) 
when utilizing UCR crime data and Alison (1994) for analysis of datasets in general. Figure 5 
portrays an example of this missingness in West Virginia that typifies the entire US dataset.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Over 20,000 individual agencies are listed in the BJS data analysis tool.   
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   Figure 4:  Missingness in West Virginia, 1984-2009 
Because West Virginia has over 400 agencies, Figure 4 contains only a representative 
10% sample for ease of interpretation. The columns represent each year in the study and every 
row represents an individual agency. Highlighted in red (darker cells) are the cells with missing 
data which also contain a “-1” indicating that a particular agency did not report drug data to the 
FBI in a specific year. The white, or non-highlighted cells, indicate that an agency in a specific 
year reported their figures and contain the actual number of drug arrests for an agency in that 
year. A visual inspection provides the reader with an immediate sense of the overall missingness 
problem. The red (darker) cells on the graphic indicate missingness as opposed to the white (non-
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highlighted) cells where the data exists. Clearly, the cells with missing data outnumber those 
with usable information.    
  The conventional method to deal with such missingness in an analysis is to perform 
multiple imputation techniques that take into consideration each of the other observations in the 
dataset and produce estimates for the missing data (Alison, 1994). Had the missingness in this 
study been observed at the state level, imputation would have been straightforward because the 
rest of the variables in the dataset contained enough information about the states to have replaced 
the missing drug arrest data. However, because each state’s data is comprised of the statistics 
from every individual agency within that state, it would mean gathering an inordinate amount of 
data for each of the individual jurisdiction with missingness to impute and complete the dataset. 
Since there are over 20,000 reporting agencies (Lynch & Jarvis, 2008) and the dataset for this 
study spans over 20 years, this issue was simply too large to effectively overcome.  
 The second obstacle to overcome with using the UCR Part II drug arrest data was that, on 
its face, there appears to be an uptrend over time (see Figure 5). But this trend could be falsely 
inflated. Because Part II crimes are less serious, they tended to be less reported or not reported at 
all (Lynch & Addington, 2007; Maltz, 1999). But over time, government officials turned their 
attention toward a mounting drug problem and larger numbers of agencies began to report this 
and other Part II crimes to the FBI (Lynch & Addington, 2007; Lynch & Jarvis, 2008). As an 
example, the Reagan and Bush administrations pushed a nationwide agenda to end drug abuse 
with the so-called “war on drugs” campaign (Gerber & Jensen, 2014). Their influence potentially 
increased the number of drug offenses being reported. The increase in the number of individual 
agencies reporting Part II drug crimes created a numerical uptrend in the number of drug 
offenses reported year over year by each state. This uptrend, however, is possibly exaggerated. 
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Figure 5:  National Drug Arrest Rate, 1984 – 2009 
Because the FBI aggregates individual agency data to the state level and publishes it as 
such, it would appear that the number of reported drug arrests increased over time. Yet upon a 
closer inspection of the data at the agency level, it was not necessarily the number of arrests that 
increased for a particular state, but more likely the growing number of individual agencies within 
that state reporting the drug arrests to the FBI that increased. Figure 6 illustrates this point. The 
cells on the left-hand side of the table in Figure 6 show that many individual agencies did not 
start reporting drug arrests until after 1999 (these are represented by the dark, red cells). Past this 
date, agencies began to increasingly report their drug arrests giving the appearance of an upward 
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trend in the number of arrests when in actuality the increase was in the number of agencies 
within a state reporting the offense (represented by the white cells).  Drug arrests were 
undoubtedly taking place all along prior to 1999, but the agencies themselves were simply not 
reporting them to the FBI. Numerically this created an upward trend represented by the inset in 
Figure 6. The x-axis of the inset shows the progressive years of the analysis time frame. The y-
axis reflects the number of drug arrests reported. The first several years shows that the reported 
drug arrests were equal to zero, thus a flat, horizontal line along the x-axis. As more agencies 
began reporting drug arrests, the trend line along the x-axis began to rise creating a (likely) false 
uptrend. While it could be that the upward trend in reported drug arrests accurately reflects the 
number of drug arrests being made, considering that each of the Part I crimes since the mid-
1990s have been steadily decreasing over the same time period, the increase in drug arrests is 
suspect at best. Moreover, statistical findings that include Part II crime drug arrests reported to 
the FBI could likewise be suspect.  
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Figure 6:  False Uptrend in West Virginia, 1984 - 2009 
Data issues notwithstanding, I nonetheless performed the path analysis with the available 
data as is and, as expected, observed null findings. Taken at face value, the results indicate that 
drug arrests were not affected by the reduction of cash through EBT implementation. That being 
the case, they also cannot be confirmed to act as a mediator between cash and crime based solely 
on the mathematical formula behind Sobel’s test. I did not, however, stop the inquiry there. 
 One possible alternative method of accounting for the missing data was to take the most 
populous cities in each state and examine the amount of collective missingness reported. In 
examining the missingness in each state, it appeared larger cities were more likely to report Part 
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II crimes consistently over time with minimal amounts of missingness than smaller agencies. 
Larger cities are also more urbanized.  From the results of the stage one analyses, the reduction 
of cash had a greater effect in the more urban states, so it was plausible that these results could 
be transferred to urban cities within the states. If there was consistent reporting in these cities, the 
sum total of these cities’ data could conceivably act as a proxy for the state in which they reside. 
I examined the data from the five largest city agencies in each state (see Figure 7) and 
observed generally consistent reporting. I then aggregated their individual reported drug arrest 
totals and found the missingness issue persisted and I could not consider them a proxy for the 
entire state. Moreover, the uptrend still existed and, while I performed the first part of the 
analysis (path b in Figure 2) the results were non-significant. Although null findings generally 
indicate no association between the outcome variables and their predictors, under the current 
circumstances the more correct interpretation was that I did not have contradictory evidence 
concerning drugs as a mediator. The data was simply not robust enough. Given these data, and 
the non-significant findings associated with them, it was difficult to draw any conclusions on 
whether drugs act as a mechanism for predatory street crimes.  
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state city 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Alabama  Birmingham 356 326 375 413 875 2944 2524 1341 1369 1589 1677 1660 2738 2850 2979 2533 2513 2049 1764 1658 1630 1649 1996 2136 2735 2597
Alabama  Montgomery 377 360 330 ‐1 236 253 350 138 101 226 261 319 290 639 475 390 357 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
Alabama  Huntsville 444 324 302 182 246 275 ‐1 ‐1 333 558 435 480 704 869 1106 677 634 804 638 480 773 772 1088 1570 1314 1352
Alabama  Mobile 752 846 732 1076 1270 2627 ‐1 701 635 698 951 742 947 1127 1353 1455 ‐1 973 1333 1577 1493 1707 1670 1625 1665 1724
Alabama  Tuscalossa 268 222 ‐1 133 236 297 ‐1 ‐1 235 241 355 1 456 358 430 430 431 374 482 633 646 661 826 704 659 585
Alaska  Anchorage 275 ‐1 243 251 271 241 ‐1 212 273 255 362 661 787 ‐1 987 686 607 486 596 609 506 496 476 556 578 700
Alaska  Juneau ‐1 48 ‐1 149 29 51 29 13 4 35 12 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 54 33 32 38 47 30 26
Alaska  Fairbanks 38 34 40 42 ‐1 72 24 27 18 24 53 ‐1 47 231 123 161 105 62 53 49 30 43 96 61 70 129
Alaska  Wasilla ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 7 26 40 40 74 72 63 45 53 63 71 28 42 ‐1 59 45 37
Alaska  Sitka ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 40 ‐1 27 41 ‐1 25 14 28 30 25
Arizona  Phoenix 3592 3482 3740 4356 4701 4984 4624 4604 5036 5092 5103 5821 5747 7078 7529 7052 5836 5506 5689 6238 7076 6981 6731 6945 6371 6547
Arizona  Tuscon 394 997 1713 3126 3222 ‐1 2525 2593 3196 3975 4339 5032 4463 4303 5111 5694 6173 6247 6408 6806 7358 7844 7073 6823 6550 7421
Arizona  Mesa 391 485 380 382 360 636 516 449 639 950 1007 1458 1240 1400 1438 1294 1344 1264 1665 2171 2368 1999 2165 2258 1995 1989
Arizona  Chandler 153 157 109 240 193 390 281 288 392 321 305 322 699 653 664 786 781 734 691 693 684 604 670 772 774 605
Arizona  Scotsdale 152 107 167 174 241 261 197 222 190 264 346 420 455 ‐1 ‐1 558 714 784 706 795 800 841 1241 1188 1250 1352
Arkansas  Little Rock 225 341 370 400 449 ‐1 784 744 810 1123 1220 1488 1699 1365 1121 832 781 494 524 706 799 837 800 ‐1 759 662
Arkansas  Fayetteville 58 69 71 56 210 283 345 187 227 356 340 403 432 427 472 479 464 453 419 544 372 428 601 470 379 310
Arkansas  Springdale 80 83 81 137 125 119 126 85 78 108 115 181 193 183 185 317 310 192 134 136 293 445 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 169
Arkansas  Jonesboro 42 34 38 50 36 39 60 62 103 122 167 315 347 259 365 355 388 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 170 356 427 403 529 520
Arkansas  North Little Rock 172 95 113 137 95 284 357 459 684 504 377 586 482 470 468 339 274 736 775 765 652 590 612 627 571 468
California  Los Angeles 23151 41082 29481 34959 31552 47827 36338 23730 24762 24065 27626 26590 29451 32968 33682 27741 20048 18415 19691 23764 27676 28512 30494 27660 24171 16518
California  San Diego 5713 6515 7505 14127 17136 20152 16463 14630 14811 13497 15545 15449 12269 12649 12572 12817 12986 12541 12875 13796 15472 14636 12467 10483 9661 9968
California  San Jose 3697 4946 9169 7816 8552 9757 8360 7209 8670 7577 8541 8529 9537 10133 8344 7953 7574 6960 6723 6755 ‐1 6666 6527 6593 6213 5414
California  San Francisco 3233 4341 5364 5810 11439 13473 9698 9342 9538 9245 9622 8745 10160 9737 11253 11023 10119 8397 9300 7681 7573 7589 7807 8522 9825 8995
California  Fresno 1098 1538 2328 2196 3416 4430 4712 3795 3322 3882 4858 4464 3785 4252 4444 4416 4093 4164 4013 4564 5547 5567 6315 6514 5012 4308
Colorado  Denver 2907 3284 3461 3205 3854 3577 2831 2629 3262 4284 5057 5290 6146 6347 6865 6581 6181 5862 5574 5129 4272 4578 2742 1453 1918 1571
Colorado  Colorado Springs 566 423 416 419 553 555 534 647 729 984 1739 1244 ‐1 1290 2216 1859 2344 1743 1528 1797 1759 1718 1547 1736 1372 1038
Colorado  Aurora 725 745 ‐1 544 649 628 519 529 764 972 1208 ‐1 ‐1 1289 ‐1 1482 1353 860 787 911 960 1045 1394 1483 1450 1417
Colorado  Fort Collins 118 121 109 76 211 122 112 107 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 269 301 291 210 254 403 315 367 422 400 274 274 293 298 293
Colorado  Lakewood 296 289 254 235 294 257 210 195 238 335 394 566 433 190 199 355 507 582 751 779 884 841 922 995 918 710
Connecticut  Bridgeport 1147 1308 1259 1860 1822 1651 2050 1318 1788 2042 2134 1985 1739 1761 1503 1552 1779 1690 1297 1379 1077 907 960 1170 1154 1033
Connecticut  New Haven 739 613 696 1127 2717 2764 ‐1 1904 1864 2346 2635 2677 2436 2526 2236 1948 1801 1438 1261 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 1342 1352
Connecticut  Stamford 284 401 ‐1 892 1118 701 844 618 679 526 387 546 552 503 334 395 401 392 455 564 459 251 512 550 501 426
Connecticut  Hartford 2669 2593 1378 2049 3580 688 3383 ‐1 2583 3430 3669 3872 ‐1 3896 4151 3357 2792 3464 3329 2743 3182 3163 3277 3066 3478 3022
Connecticut  Waterbury 298 352 319 664 996 1385 1528 1006 709 785 1048 1267 1296 1007 1308 1301 978 1152 1106 1085 1102 940 1137 1010 940 835
Delaware  Wilmington 635 619 605 ‐1 592 989 1009 1212 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 963 924 1014 957 1083 1217 772 1092 1108 1054 1205 1218
Delaware  Dover 28 30 46 58 132 179 154 204 157 163 238 194 212 205 231 230 316 188 138 293 327 353 387 389 388 341
Delaware  Newark 71 75 60 68 72 87 44 59 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 49 44 64 66 70 85 88 122 116 144 135 126 159 133
Delaware  Middletown 4 2 1 3 7 4 11 15 24 ‐1 16 ‐1 2 1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 59 79
Delaware  Milford 18 9 7 15 9 28 22 29 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 47 76 44 60 49 25 27 62 71 96 95 93 74 141
Florida  Metro‐Dade 3672 3303 3773 3517 ‐1 ‐1 4471 ‐1 4329 4287 4852 4069 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
Florida  Miami 2928 3225 6483 6388 ‐1 ‐1 7555 ‐1 6442 6981 7487 4998 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
Florida  Tampa 2623 2477 2872 3542 ‐1 ‐1 2485 ‐1 2603 2737 3546 6134 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
Florida  Orlando ‐1 915 926 1295 ‐1 ‐1 1701 ‐1 1320 1817 2453 2504 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
Florida  St. Petersburg 702 942 1153 1608 ‐1 ‐1 1299 ‐1 1410 1686 2103 2078 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1
Georgia  atlanta 3617 3197 3934 ‐1 6901 9929 10142 10354 8680 7982 7047 8945 10982 13019 10902 10519 10135 9592 8819 8121 10147 12812 12584 7540 8302 8275
Georgia  warner robbins 67 96 112 202 274 332 239 146 196 149 121 144 260 331 305 286 266 279 292 305 318 331 344 359 386 413
Georgia  savannah 425 479 421 639 931 1048 789 529 592 637 524 410 456 458 460 470 475 484 797 1007 1217 1427 1637 1845 1555 1304
Georgia  athens 34 35 52 7 34 59 60 61 331 168 5 214 422 619 335 448 469 491 464 501 474 634 664 718 630 550
Georgia  macon 351 425 428 435 442 636 830 1023 965 670 543 557 552 483 481 478 552 588 716 772 923 501 628 847 901 680
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sample of Missingness on the Top 5 Cities in Ten US States, 1984 – 2009 
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CHAPTER V 
Discussion 
Review of Results 
Cash and Crime 
 
 The findings in this research indicate that reductions in the amount of circulating cash 
tends to effect predatory street crime. At the national level, implementation of the EBT system 
significantly reduced not only street crime in the aggregate, but also each of its constituent parts; 
robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft. These results are consistent with Wright et al.’s earlier 
findings in that, first, cash is a substantial motivator of predatory street crime and, second, 
interrupting the flow of cash reduces the occurrence of street crime. But where previous research 
stops, I pressed the cash and crime relationship further by testing and comparing the relationship 
in the highest and lowest states receiving SNAP benefits, the most urban and rural states, and the 
states with the highest and lowest levels of overall street crime. These analyses provided a more 
robust understanding of the effect than a simple national overall analysis. 
As stated earlier, in addition to street crime in general being decreased nationwide, if the 
introduction of EBT in fact reduced predatory street crime, it should also be the case that the 
states receiving the highest levels of benefits see the strongest drops. This is because the states 
receiving the most benefits were likely the states with the highest amounts of circulating cash 
prior to the EBT switch. The findings from this study support this hypothesis. All five of the 
predatory crimes dropped significantly. By comparison, the states receiving the lowest amount of 
SNAP benefits had no significant decreases. These results are important because they support the 
idea that the systematic removal of circulating cash through payments technology can lead to a 
reduction of predatory offending. 
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I also conducted a further analysis comparing the reduction of street crime in urban and 
rural areas. This was necessary because the argument could be made that many of the states in 
the SNAP analysis are rural and street crime is typically an urban phenomenon and the results of 
the previous analysis could contain some measure of selection bias. Street crime is a consistent 
facet of urban environments (Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Lochner, 
2004; McBride-Murry et al., 2011) and these crimes are often predatory (Freeman, 2000; 
Hallsworth, 2013) so a decrease in circulating cash should result in a higher reduction in 
predatory offenses in the more metropolitan areas. To address this supposition, I compared the 
EBT implementation effect in the most urban states to its effect in the most rural states. Again, as 
expected, the findings revealed that the reduction of cash had a stronger impact in urban dense 
areas where two of the five outcome variables saw significant reductions where none of these 
crimes in the rural areas were significantly affected. The most urban states had significant 
reductions in robbery and burglary while EBT implementation had no significant effect on any of 
the crime outcomes in the most rural states. These results augment the notion that cash plays a 
significant role in street crime.    
As a final test of the link between circulating cash and street crime, I investigated this 
relationship in the states with the nation’s highest and lowest levels of overall street crime. If 
cash and street crime are linked in a linear fashion, it should be the case that states with the 
highest levels of street crime react differently to the reduction of circulation cash than the states 
with the lowest levels. The significant findings were, in fact, spread between groups indicating 
that cash may possibly drive street offending differently in areas with varying levels of overall 
street crime; at least in the cases of robbery and auto theft. These results shed additional light on 
the relationship at a more granular level. In contrast to the each of the findings in the previous 
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two analyses where only one group experienced significant reductions in street crime(s), the 
results of this inquiry illustrated that cash affects crime differently where overall street crime is 
varied. In the states with the highest levels of overall street crime, burglary decreased by 5.6%; 
post EBT implementation. However, auto theft increased by 4.9%. By comparison, in the states 
with the lowest levels of overall street crime, the only significant change resulting from EBT 
implementation brought about a 4.1% increase in robbery. This is the only analysis in which 
crime went up. While a number of assumptions could be made about this particular result, all that 
can be accurately stated about this finding is that it might provide insight as to how cash 
motivates some forms of crime in areas where overall street crime is varied.    
 This study shows a distinct relationship between cash and street crime overall. Reducing 
the amount of circulating cash brought about significant changes in the levels of street crime. 
There is evidence that certain crime rates fell more in urban areas. The same areas where street 
life adherence was strongest. This is in line with the expectations set forth by scholars in 
previous studies (Hallsworth, 2013; Anderson, 1999). But the link was particularly strong in 
areas where poverty and government assistance are prevalent (highest  SNAP receiving states) 
where all street crime rates fell after implementation. This was consistent with what would be 
expected based on the previous literature because it lowered cash in high cash areas (Brown & 
Males, 2011; Hannon & DeFronzo, 1998; McBride-Murry et al., 2011; Muggah, 2012; Small & 
Newman, 2001). The effect of reducing cash on predatory offending was stronger in, and unique 
to, those states receiving the highest amount of government assistance (SNAP) due to an 
impoverished status. Prior to the EBT switch, SNAP benefits were disbursed in paper check form 
that recipients customariliy cashed. The areas with the highest number of SNAP beneficiaries 
naturally created a more cash-rish environment than those states receiving the least amount of 
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SNAP disbursements. After the conversion to the EBT system, the subsequent reductions in the 
number of people carrying cash were, naturally, greater in the states receiving the highest 
anmounts of SNAP benefits. With the removal of so many recipients carrying cash, there were 
immensely fewer potential victims of predatory crimes. Unsurprisingly, the significant 
reductions in predatory crimes were greater in comparison to the lowest SNAP receiving states.   
 Additionally, the results in this study offer a unique, quantitative insight into the effect 
that cash has on street offending. Up to now, the research regarding street offending has been 
largely qualitative (Anderson, 1999; Bennett & Wright, 1984; Brezina, Tekin, & Topalli, 2009; 
Cherbonneau & Jacobs, 2015; Jacobs & Cherbonneau, 2014; Jacobs & Wright,1999; Jacobs, 
Topalli, & Wright, 2003; Jacobs,  Topalli & Wright, 2000; Maguire & Bennett, 1982; 
Miller,1998; Shover & Honaker, 1992; Topalli & Wright, 2004; Topalli & Wright, 2013; 
Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 2002; Vigil, 2010; Wright & Decker, 1994; Wright & Decker, 
1997; Wright, Brookman, & Bennett, 2005; Wright, Topalli, & Jacques, 2014). And of the 
quantitative studies (Hallsworth, 2013; Krivo & Peterson, 1996; Silverman, 2004; Stewart & 
Simons, 2006; Wright et al., 2017), only one has analyzed the influence cash has on street 
offending (Wright et al., 2017). The research performed in the current study probed deeper into 
the understanding of the specific environments in which street crime was prevalent.  By doing 
so, a more developed quantitative picture emerged into the nature of predatory street offending 
and the environments in which it thrives. Cash-rich environments, such as those created prior to 
the advent of the EBT system, serve as prime areas for predatory offending; the same types of 
crimes commonly associated with street life. This finding supports the suggestions made in much 
of the previous qualitative research (Brezina, Tekin, & Topalli, 2009; Jacobs, 2000; Jacobs & 
Wright, 1999; Jacobs, Topalli, & Wright, 2000; Miller, 1998; Naylor, 2003, 2004; Topalli & 
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Wright, 2013; Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 2002; Wright & Decker, 1997; Wright Brookman, 
& Bennet, 2005). Moreover, crime rates appear to be more affected in urban, impoverished, high 
benefits-receiving areas where street culture thrives, again aligning with extant qualitative 
research (Muggah, 2012; Small & Newman, 2001; Topalli & Wright, 2004; Wright, Topalli, & 
Jacques, 2014).   
 Finally, the findings revealed a previously unknown and interesting characteristic about 
the relationship between cash and predatory crime specific to the top and bottom street crime 
states analysis. In the states where street crime was the highest, post EBT implementation, the 
rate of burglary dropped but the rate of auto theft increased. In the states where street crime was 
lowest, the rate of robbery increased. These results revealed that predatory crime may occur 
differently in areas with varying levels of street crime. Unfortunately, without stronger data, this 
interpretation is all that can be said without speculation. It is likely that there is more at work 
below the surface of these results; however, an in-depth understanding of this phenomenon 
fleshing out the reasons behind this finding might require further research from a qualitative 
perspective.   
 Drugs as a Mediator 
 Turning now to the second stage of the analysis, while the direct effect findings were 
significant and shed important additional light on the cash and crime connection, unfortunately, 
the available data did not allow for a definitive investigation of drugs as the mediating 
mechanism. The amount of missingness in the data was too much to overcome. With more 
robust data, the notion that drugs act as the mechanism driving the need to commit crime to 
acquire cash might be tested more thoroughly. However, that notwithstanding, among street life 
participants cash has its own attractions with the potential for direct effects on criminality 
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independent of its role in the acquisition of drugs (Hallsworth, 2013). Nonetheless, to determine 
a mediator there first must be a significant relationship between the outcome and its predictor, 
and the examination results show a firm statistical association between cash and crime. These 
findings could serve as a foundation upon for a future mediation analysis should better data 
become available in the future.  
Limitations 
Recall that the logic behind the study was that cash fuels street crime and that drugs may 
mediate that relationship. While the research conducted offers insight into the cash and crime 
connection, no new information arose regarding the role of drugs driving this relationship. 
However, the findings in both stages of this research should be considered within the boundaries 
of the data used to derive them. The data serving as the foundation for these analyses were the 
crimes reported to the FBI made available through the UCR. Mentioned earlier, researchers have 
expressed two chief concerns over the use of these data. First, the UCR captures only the number 
of crimes reported as opposed to the actual number of crimes that occurred in a certain 
jurisdiction (Lynch & Addington, 2006; Maltz & Targonski, 2002). For instance, some crimes, 
such as being robbed for illicit drug proceeds, go unreported because doing so would place the 
person reporting it at risk of arrest for their involvement in such illicit activity in the first place. 
In fact, this “dark figure” of crime is the issue criminologists most often contend with when 
conducting (street) crime research (Biderman & Reiss, 1967; Coleman & Moynihan, 1996; 
Jacobs, 2000; MacDonald, 2002; Topalli, Wright, & Fornango, 2002). The current research was 
subject to the same limitation. In essence, this research captured the effect of reducing cash on 
reported street crime and the results, therefore, may contain some element of bias because 
unreported crimes were missing from the final data set. 
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  There was also the issue of inconsistent reporting issues with the Part I offense data. 
Studies show that some agencies may skip one or several months’ reporting throughout the year 
choosing rather to transmit all their figures at year end (Akiyama & Rosenthal, 1990; Lynch & 
Addington, 2006; Skogan, 1974). This issue is a broad and long running issue, and overcoming it 
is beyond the scope of this study. Still, to address it, I used year-end data which minimized this 
problem. I acknowledge that this method might not account for erroneous reporting year over 
year but the chance of multiple errors over multiple was small. Yet, the necessity for more robust 
data in this area is apparent. Even without the reporting missingness problems, there is still the 
issue of the “dark figure” of crime. When using data such as those found in the UCR Part I and II 
crimes, researchers are only able to base findings on what was reported which may or may not be 
different in relation to the true number of crimes that occurred. One important step toward even 
more robust analyses would be for studies encompassing and anticipating crimes where dark 
figure missingness may be problematic, to incorporate qualitative data specific to both the crime 
and the reporting of that crime.   
Implications 
Crime and Enforcement  
The findings in this study demonstrate that reducing the amount of circulating cash may 
be a useful tool to lessen the occurrence predatory offending. It appears that the ever-evolving 
developments in payments technologies, such as those like the EBT system, could increasingly 
deny street offenders the opportunity to commit predatory crimes simply because they lower the 
amount of available cash necessary to continue such behaviour. Although it is unlikely that US 
society will eliminate cash soon, in the interim law enforcement would be well-served directing 
street crime reduction efforts toward urban impoverished areas where cash remains a 
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predominant transactional medium. Combining innovations that promote a more digital economy 
with concentrated policing efforts has the potential to drive crime even further below their 
current rates. Members of law enforcement might also consider adding into their training 
programs, information about not only how cash drives certain street crimes, but about the such 
crimes that may emerge as a result of the increasing shortage of cash carrying potential victims.   
While interrupting the flow of cash appears to lower the rate of street crime, data from 
the FBI indicates that financial fraud is on the rise (Choo, 2011; FBI IC3, 2016). Moving 
forward in time, cash as a transactional medium displays all the signs of a continued decline 
(FRBSF, 2015). Payments systems such as the EBT system will continue to evolve, 
incorporating new technologies and capabilities. While it is evident that cash is in decline, other 
forms of money are already poised to take its place (Kelly, 2014). Cutting-edge innovations are 
ushering in a new economy and with it new forms of crime (Choo, 2011; Shrier, Canale, & 
Pentland, 2016). At the same time, mobile and other internet-based payment systems will begin 
to exert their own influences on crime. Changing money means changing crime, making it likely 
that new types of offenders will also emerge in the age of digital payments (FBI IC3, 2016).  
Modernizations in digital payments bring with them new opportunities for crime and new 
types of offenders to commit them. Given that offenders commit their crimes within the 
parameters of what they have to work with (see Cornish & Clarke, 2014), this could be extended 
to the idea that the form of crime you get is related to the form of currency you use. Crime itself 
could be adapting to and exploiting advanced technologies as it moves into the future, perhaps a 
shift in what would normally be considered traditional crime. Take, for example, the American 
crime decline, which has been taking place for over three decades. At about the same time 
American crime rates began to drop, technological advances in the electronic payments were 
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increasing at an unprecedented rate (Shrier, Canale, & Pentland, 2016), the same technology that 
created the EBT system removing cash from circulation (Rhine & Greene, 2013). Given that the 
EBT program and other alternative payments solutions came on line at approximately the same 
time crime rates began to descend, it is not unreasonable to speculate that these systems might 
have been responsible for at least some portion of the drop. This is not to say, however, that 
crime was dying out over this period. Rather, it could be that it was simply changing form given 
the new opportunities with which offenders were presented; perhaps to a form that until recently, 
the FBI had not captured. As the nation moves closer to a cashless society, law enforcement will 
need to respond in new innovative ways to effectively reduce these opportunities.  
Policy 
Although the government implemented the EBT system for the purposes of increasing 
efficiency, saving operating costs, and reducing fraud, the program also affected street crime by 
fundamentally reducing the amount of circulating cash. Further advances in this type of 
technology, therefore, could conceivably reduce crime as a resource for obtaining cash and 
lessen participation in the criminal economy. The findings in this study imply that continued 
advances in payments technology could be central to lowering street crime rates even further. 
Each year the industry develops ever changing technologies further digitizing payments. In that 
respect, officials might advocate for policies that encourage and reward the trend toward even 
more widespread electronic payment alternatives, especially where they are seen to provide a net 
benefit to society in the form of crime and harm reduction. Incorporating strategies that reduce 
the amount of cash in circulation even further could be beneficial in future approaches to crime 
prevention. 
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Given that the form of crime you get connects to the form of currency you use, future 
policy and crime prevention strategies must also account for these technologies in both the short 
and long term. While completely eliminating cash from American society is unlikely, law 
makers and government officials may possibly consider partnering with corporate leaders in the 
electronic transactions and banking industries to construct innovative strategies to address the 
changing face of crime in the digital space. If governments, either individually or collectively, 
work toward garnering the cooperation and guidance from entities such as VISA, MasterCard, 
electronic transaction processors, local banks, and alternative payments companies (i.e. PayPal, 
Apple Pay, Venmo). In this way, officials could create stronger prevention strategies to 
effectively deal with the crimes which exploit advances in virtual payments technologies. 
Moreover, this type of partnership could produce new data upon which build stronger crime 
prevention policies as society approaches a cashless, online state.  
Future Research 
When Congress enacted the change to the EBT program, the design was not intended to 
directly or indirectly reduce street crime. Yet, the analyses performed in this research 
demonstrated a significant relationship between EBT implementation and a decline in predatory 
crimes; the effect varying by location, urban density, benefit recipients, and existing levels of 
street crime. The implementation of EBT most likely had its effect on these outcomes via its 
ability to remove cash from those areas where predatory crime is prevalent. These effects were 
ancillary and unintended though highly beneficial outcomes of the legislation mandating the 
switch from paper checks to electronic disbursement.  
 Scholars interested in further developing the currency and crime relationship might 
consider the correlations between electronic transaction innovations and subsequent reductions in 
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crime outcomes. Such inquiries might include how these innovations have affected the type of 
crimes street offenders commit, crimes that have emerged in response to alternative payments 
solutions, and how the criminal justice system has adapted to these changes. For instance, as cash 
continues its decline, monetary instruments are not only changing to adapt to new technologies, 
but are also becoming more virtual. This change brings with it a multitude of issues such as 
jurisdictional authority (currently cyber space remains open and unregulated) and emerging 
crime trends. With this comes the need for new types of data from sources outside traditional law 
enforcement; quantitative and qualitative. The government and academics should consider 
working with banks, technology companies, and other private agencies to construct rich, 
longitudinal data sets more suited for both the continued analysis of predatory crimes and the 
new types of crimes to come in the emerging era of advanced payments technologies.  
Conclusion 
The effect of EBT implementation on predatory crime is only a small part of the overall 
story. Payment systems at large could be, in part, responsible for the decline in certain street 
crimes not only in this study, but in the continued research occurring around the world in this 
area. Yet surprisingly the amount of research focused on the influence of cash and payments 
technology as they relate to crime pales in comparison to the larger body of work related to other 
types of crime motivations. There is a profound global change happening with cash, currencies, 
and payments that could well exert its influence on the way crime is and will be conducted 
moving forward. Changes in economic technologies will likely spawn changes in crime, the 
enforcement of crime, crime research, and crime policy.  How this trend toward a cashless 
economy will affect crime in the future is an important question for scholars to begin 
considering.  
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